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CONFRONTING THE TWO FACES OF CORPORATE FRAUD
Miriam H. Baer*
Abstract
Some criminals engage in meticulous planning. Others commit
crimes in the heat of the moment. Corporate fraud incorporates both
planned and spur-of-the-moment misconduct. Although law and
economics scholars have traditionally viewed corporate fraud as a
manifestation of opportunism among the corporation’s agents, a new
generation of scholars, influenced by findings in behavioral
psychology, has focused on the temporal aspects of corporate
misconduct. Wrongdoing comes about, not simply because an agent
opportunistically takes advantage of her principal, but also because
her short-term self falls prey to temptations and cognitive biases that
effectively disable her law-abiding long-term self.
Although the law and economics and behavioral psychology
accounts separately offer important lessons for observers of corporate
fraud, neither theory addresses the regulatory implications
confronting opportunistic behavior and temporal inconsistency at the
same time. How can an internal corporate enforcer best respond to the
“two faces” of corporate fraud? This Article explores this question,
first by analyzing the interaction between the two dispositions, and
then by considering the relative merits of various enforcement
approaches.
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INTRODUCTION
Some people hurt others by failing to follow through on their bestlaid plans. A corporate manager advises in good faith that he will
commence the long-term project that will enhance his unit’s earnings
and make it more competitive over time. Nevertheless, at the end of
the month, he finds that he is no closer to implementing the new
project than he was when he first pitched it to his supervisor. To make
things worse, when the manager is asked to report his unit’s monthly
progress, he falsely asserts that he has worked steadily on the project,
going so far as to submit fraudulent expense reports to demonstrate
significant efforts towards achieving his goal.
Other individuals impose harm by meticulously following through
on their malicious intentions. A murderer who plots an assassination
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and patiently awaits his prey is an extreme example. Bernard
Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, in which he persuaded thousands of
unwitting victims to invest their money in nonexistent funds, is the
less violent version. The problem in both cases is not that an
individual changes his mind, but rather, that the individual adheres to
and carries out his maleficent plans. This is the very type of
consistency that Bernard Madoff’s sentencing court found so
chilling.1
The dichotomy between people who fail to adhere to their positive
plans and those who steadfastly carry out their evil intentions poses a
significant challenge for law enforcers. If individuals engage in
varying degrees of opportunistic behavior and simultaneously enjoy
different degrees of self-control, how can we effectively deter
wrongdoing?
This Article explores this question with regard to the pervasive and
recurring problem of corporate fraud, in which corporate managers
defraud the corporate entity and its shareholders through some
combination of deliberate misrepresentations and false statements.2
Although this Article focuses on what is commonly classified as
“securities” or “accounting fraud,” much of the analysis is
generalizable to other forms of wrongdoing, such as bribery and
embezzlement.3
The law and economics literature views corporate fraud as an
extreme example of the agency-cost problem.4 Corporate agents abuse
their discretion and authority to take advantage of their principals.5 At
1. See Benjamin Weiser, Judge Explains 150-Year Sentence for Madoff, N.Y. TIMES
(June 28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/29/nyregion/judge-denny-chin-recounts-histhoughts-in-bernard-madoff-sentencing.html (recounting Judge Denny Chin’s views of
Madoff’s crime); see also Transcript of Proceedings as to Bernard L. Madoff Held on June 29,
2009 at 10:00 AM Before Judge Denny Chin at 42–49, United States v. Bernard L. Madoff,
No.
09-CR-00213
(S.D.N.Y.
July
20,
2009),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/madoff/20090629sentencingtranscriptcorrected.pdf
(“The
breach of trust was massive. Investors—individuals, charities, pension funds, institutional
clients—were repeatedly lied to . . . .”).
2. See, e.g., Daniel T. Ostas, When Fraud Pays: Executive Self-Dealing and the Failure
of Self-Restraint, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 571, 571 (2007) (defining fraud broadly as the type of
conduct “by which one individual can gain an advantage over another through deliberate false
suggestion, concealment, or misrepresentation of the truth”).
3. For an exhaustive look at the different types of fraud that arise within the corporation,
see generally JOSEPH T. WELLS, CORPORATE FRAUD HANDBOOK: PREVENTION AND DETECTION
2–4 (3d ed. 2011).
4. “Securities fraud may best be understood as a species of agency costs.” Amanda M.
Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U.
PA. L. REV. 2173, 2182 (2010).
5. See, e.g., Usha Rodrigues, From Loyalty to Conflict: Addressing Fiduciary Duty at
the Officer Level, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1, 3 & n.1 (2009) (ascribing corporate wrongdoing to
conflicts of interest and managerial agency costs). The seminal account on agency costs is set
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numerous junctures, the agent favors himself over the larger populace
in whose favor the agent is supposed to act.6 In response, the law
offers a combination of sticks and carrots to better bind the agent to
his principal and deter the agent’s self-serving and opportunistic
behavior.7
Meanwhile, an alternative view explains wrongdoing as the result
of a momentary lapse of judgment. According to this narrative,
individuals engage in misconduct when they fall prey to their shortterm desires, despite their more socially desirable long-term plans.8
The short-term self acts in ways that the long-term self explicitly
abhors, up to and including perpetrating violations of law.9 The shortterm self can impose costs either by repeatedly failing to commence
activities that carry large up-front costs, but are ultimately beneficial,
(e.g., procrastination), or by engaging too easily (or too often) in
activities that are initially pleasant, but ultimately harmful (e.g.,
overconsumption).10
Behavioral researchers explain these lapses as the result of a
phenomenon known as “hyperbolic discounting.” Whereas rational
individuals simply value the present over the future, hyperbolic
discounters impose an excessively large discount on changes in utility
that occur closest to the present, leading some to call the preference
an “immediacy” or “present bias.”11 The bias persists because the
discount the individual assigns a given interval is very high for near
term periods, but much smaller for periods that occur at some later
forth in Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308–12 (1976).
6. “Agency costs exist whenever a principal entrusts power to an agent to act on her
behalf. The agent may rent-seek, . . . shirk her duty[,] or slack off. Or she may seek to fulfill her
job in good faith, but make choices that her principal would not want her to make.” Usha
Rodrigues, Entity and Identity, 60 EMORY L.J. 1257, 1267 (2011). For a discussion of agency
costs generally and their relationship to corporate crime, see Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially
Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 834–35 (1994).
7. See, e.g., Nicola Faith Sharpe, Process Over Structure: An Organizational Behavior
Approach to Improving Corporate Boards, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 261, 264–65 (2012) (observing
that “[m]ost current regulation and regulatory reform proposals attempt to reduce corporate
failure by reducing agency costs”).
8. E.g., Manuel A. Utset, Time-Inconsistent Management and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 417, 418 (2005).
9. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control, 96 AM.
ECON. REV. 1449, 1449–51 (2006).
10. See, e.g., Brian Galle & Manuel Utset, Is Cap-and-Trade Fair to the Poor?
Shortsighted Households and the Timing of Consumption Taxes, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 33,
65–68 (2010) (setting forth a mathematical model for overconsumption and procrastination).
11. “Stable, time-consistent preferences require a constant exponential discount factor;
hyperbolic discounting generates time-inconsistent preferences, sometimes described as present
bias.” Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins,
Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1033, 1043 (2012).
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date.12 Waiting an hour from “now” for a piece of chocolate cake
feels much worse than waiting the same hour if that wait is slated to
occur in some future period.13 By the same token, commencing a
difficult project—such as a long paper—feels inordinately more
difficult the day the writer sits down at his computer than one week
from today, when the same writer plans to commence the very same
project. Because of these differences, hyperbolic individuals have a
tendency to switch course in often unexpected and self-destructive
ways.14
The temporal inconsistency literature prescribes a significantly
different role for legal actors from the standard law and economics
canon. Instead of manipulating incentives for good behavior, legal
actors should help individuals find ways to control their short-term
selves.15 The mechanism that sophisticated individuals adopt in order
to restrain their temporal inconsistency is often referred to as a
“precommitment device.”16 The device “precommits” the individual
to his long-term plans by eliminating, or making more difficult,
certain options in advance of some foreseen event.17 Through legal
rules and institutions, legal actors can either mandate or encourage the
12. “Hyperbolic discounting involves very steep discounting in the immediate short run
and much shallower discounting further out.” Lee Anne Fennell, Unbundling Risk, 60 DUKE
L.J. 1285, 1348 n.256, 1349 n.259 (2011) (citing GEORGE AINSLIE, BREAKDOWN OF WILL 32 &
fig.2B (2001)); see also Lee Anne Fennell, Willpower Taxes, 99 GEO. L.J. 1371, 1378 n.35
(2011) [hereinafter Fennell, Willpower Taxes].
13. “[F]or many people, preferences between logically identical sets of choices may
reverse in a predictable direction as the temporal context of the choice changes.” Russell B.
Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1120 (2000) (explaining
preference switching).
14. Cf., e.g., id. (“An individual might plan to save X percent of her salary next year but
then decide when she receives it that she prefers to spend it rather than save (thus making
appropriate the cliché that money can ‘burn a hole’ in one’s pocket).”).
15. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1159, 1162 (2003) (arguing that government can and
should “steer people’s choices in welfare-promoting directions” by framing choices in
particular ways). For an extended account of how government can do this in various consumeroriented contexts, see generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).
16. Ulysses’ decision to tie himself to the mast of his ship and plug his sailors’ ears with
wax in advance of sailing near the Sirens is the classic example. 1 HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 445,
447 (A.T. Murray trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1919); see also John A. Robertson, “Paying the
Alligator”: Precommitment in Law, Bioethics, and Constitutions, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1729, 1731
(2003). See generally JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY,
PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS (2000) (examining the benefits of, and philosophical
justifications for, precommitment devices). For additional discussion, see infra Section I.D.
17. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Precommitment Strategies in Corporate Law: The Case
of Dead Hand and No Hand Pills, 29 J. CORP. L. 1, 4–5 (2003) (describing and explaining
precommitment strategies in corporate governance).
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adoption of precommitment devices.
Numerous scholars have written separately on temporal
inconsistency and corporate opportunism, and several scholars, most
notably Professor Manuel Utset, have explored the connection
between temporal inconsistency and corporate crime and
governance.18 This Article expands on this scholarship, first by
considering how both opportunism and temporal inconsistency
interact within the corporate firm, and then by considering how this
interaction challenges the corporation’s internal compliance
department.19 The compliance department is the internal unit tasked
with preventing and reducing serious wrongdoing within the
organization.20 If fraud arises out of both opportunistic and temporally
inconsistent behavior, the corporation’s compliance personnel bear
the burden of comprehending and responding effectively to these
18. Professor Utset has written extensively on this topic and was one of the first legal
scholars to demonstrate temporal inconsistency’s relationship to corporate crime. See, e.g.,
Manuel A. Utset, Corporate Actors, Corporate Crimes and Time-Inconsistent Preferences, 1
VA. J. CRIM. L. 265, 320–24 (2013) (praising portions of the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank
Acts as counterweights to temporal inconsistency in corporations); Manuel A. Utset,
Hyperbolic Criminals and Repeated Time-Inconsistent Misconduct, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 609,
623–25, 659 (2007) [hereinafter Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals] (applying temporal inconsistency
theory to explain white-collar criminal conduct); Utset, supra note 8, at 418, 428–29 (arguing
that “adherence to the time-consistency assumption can lead to mistaken policy decisions”
regarding corporate managers). For more general analyses of temporal inconsistency theory to
criminal law and procedure, see Richard H. McAdams, Present Bias and Criminal Law, 2011
U. ILL. L. REV. 1607, 1614–28, and Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Crime, Punishment, and the
Psychology of Self-Control, 61 EMORY L.J. 501, 545–52 (2012). McAdams also briefly touched
upon the subject in a discussion of the signaling value of social norms. See Richard H.
McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Law, Norms, and Economic Methodology, 110 YALE L.J.
625, 657–61 (2001) [hereinafter McAdams, Signaling] (reviewing ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND
SOCIAL NORMS (2000)) (explaining how inconsistent discount rates complicate Posner’s
contention that so-called social norms reflect low discount rates that individuals signal to each
other).
19. Whether this department is a stand-alone function or should be housed within the
corporation’s legal department is a source of substantial debate. See, e.g., Michele DeStefano,
Beyond Benchmarking: How Should Law and Corporate Compliance Intersect?, SLIDESHARE
(Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.slideshare.net/micheledestefano/beyond-benchmarking-howshould-law-and-corporate-compliance-intersect (presentation at Harvard Law School Program
on the Legal Profession); Michele DeStefano, Creating A Culture of Compliance: Why
Departmentalization May Not Be the Answer, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 71, 82–86 (2014).
20. “‘Compliance’ is a system of policies and controls that organizations adopt to deter
violations of law and to assure external authorities that they are taking steps to deter violations
of law.” Miriam H. Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 958 (2009).
Professor Paul McGreal has conducted surveys on corporate compliance and compliance law
and regulation for at least the last eight years. See Paul E. McGreal, Corporate Compliance
Survey, 68 BUS. LAW. 163, 163 & n.1 (2012). For earlier analyses of compliance programs
adopted in response to specific settlement agreements with federal agencies, see generally F.
Joseph Warin & Jason C. Schwartz, Corporate Compliance Programs as a Component of Plea
Agreements and Civil and Administrative Settlements, 24 J. CORP. L. 71 (1998).
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overlapping causes.21
This Article adopts the premise that individuals are, by varying
degrees, opportunistic and temporally inconsistent. To better
understand how these two dispositions interact, the Article
hypothesizes a simplified world in which individuals simultaneously
occupy positions on two different spectra at any given time. The first
spectrum refers to the individual’s motivation towards others, and the
second indicates the individual’s ability to act consistently over
successive periods of time. The interaction between these two
dispositions generates a typology of employees who are:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

well-motivated, and temporally consistent;
well-motivated, and temporally inconsistent;
opportunistic, and temporally inconsistent; and
opportunistic and temporally consistent.

From this typology, one can see why corporate fraud so often mixes
planned and impulsive conduct. With the exception of the employees
in category (a), everyone within the corporation has the potential to
contribute to or perpetrate a fraud.
Having identified this typology, this Article introduces a number
of strategies an internal corporate enforcer might employ in response
to these various prototypes. Although compliance personnel have
developed a plethora of programs in response to potential
wrongdoing, much of their work falls within two categories: the
corporate policing approach that is familiar to many, and a structural
approach one might call “corporate architecture.”22 The policing
approach reduces corporate crime by empowering internal policemen
to identify, punish, and deter actual and would-be transgressors. The
21. The Article thus takes up the task suggested by Professor Daniel Medwed’s comment
on Professor Utset’s work. See Daniel S. Medwed, Comment, Deterrence Theory and the
Corporate Criminal Actor: Professor Utset’s Fresh Take on an Old Problem, 1 VA. J. CRIM. L.
65, 66 (2013) (querying whether “internal regulation can also be used to protect against the
potential overconsumption of criminal activity that derives from time-inconsistent preferences”
(emphasis omitted)). It also builds on the distinction I first raised elsewhere regarding the
difference between “sanction-based enforcement” and “structural regulation.” Miriam H. Baer,
Temporal Inconsistency and the Regulation of Corporate Misconduct, 1 VA. J. CRIM. L. 350,
360–69 (2013).
22. The structural approach is similar to situational crime prevention, which has been
defined as “‘the conscious design or manipulation of immediate environments . . . to make
crime more difficult, more risky, and/or less rewarding . . . to potential offenders.’” Danny
Rosenthal, Assessing Digital Preemption (and the Future of Law Enforcement?), 14 NEW
CRIM. L. REV. 576, 580 (2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Tim Hope & Richard Sparks,
For a Sociological Theory of Situations (or How Useful Is Pragmatic Criminology?), in
ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION 175, 175 n.2 (Andrew
von Hirsch et al. eds., 2000)). Both approaches are discussed more extensively infra Part III.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 1 [], Art. 2

94

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

architectural approach encourages corporate personnel to seek out and
mitigate problematic situations as opposed to problematic people. It
seeks proactively to improve decision-making systems, thereby
reducing the opportunity and temptation for fraud. It is at once less
judgmental and yet potentially more intrusive.
The optimal mix of policing and architecture should vary for
different corporations. A number of characteristics in today’s
enforcement environment, however, favor policing over architecture,
which in turn may harm shareholders and the general public.
This Article unfolds in four parts. Part I briefly reviews the
opportunism and temporal inconsistency literatures and analyzes their
contribution to our understanding of fraud and optimal enforcement
strategies. Drawing upon these two theories, Part II constructs a
typology of wrongdoers (and do-gooders) within the corporation. This
typology, in turn, should guide the corporations’s internal compliance
efforts.
Part III discusses the contrasts between two internal enforcement
approaches: policing and architecture. The two approaches can serve
either as substitutes or complements. Policing offers strong
protections against consistent, opportunistic wrongdoers; architecture
provides more value to populations that are generally well-motivated
but prone to hyperbolic behavior. Both approaches are essential
components of an effective corporate compliance program.
Finally, Part IV examines and critiques the current state of affairs
in corporate compliance. If corporate fraud truly has “two faces,” then
corporate compliance departments need to focus on generating as
many good architects as policemen. For a number of reasons,
however, it is doubtful that compliance departments are striking the
right balance. This Article therefore ends with a call for a more
sustained analysis of the interaction between temporal inconsistency
and opportunistic behavior.
I. OPPORTUNISTIC AGENTS AND TEMPORALLY INCONSISTENT
DECISION MAKERS
Despite their obvious differences, Fortune 500 corporations,
privately owned businesses, nonprofits, and public agencies all share
in common key organizational characteristics. As soon as they reach a
certain size, most if not all include bureaucratic centers and
supervisory relationships between employees and managers.23 When
23. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Organization of Work, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 5,
35 (1980) (predicting the emergence of hierarchy in “organizations of any size,” including
private businesses, nonprofits, and government agencies). For an argument that corporate law
itself, by vesting authority in a board of directors, fuels hierarchy, see Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Director Primacy, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 17, 23
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they behave well, these organizations provide great benefits to
society, as they efficiently allocate resources, achieve agreed-upon
redistributive goals, and provide tangible and intangible
improvements in public welfare.24
Sometimes, however, organizations do not behave well. Or, since
organizations lack a mind or soul, the more accurate claim is that
some or all of their members do not behave well.25 Those who occupy
the highest ranks of authority within their organizations abuse their
discretion, slack off when no one is noticing, ignore internal rules,
engage in self-dealing, violate external laws, and cause all sorts of
harm to both outsiders and other members of the organization. Taken
as a whole, these harms comprise the agency costs that have long
been the focus of scholars who write about private and public
organizations.26
In recent decades, the specter of fraud has emerged as a significant
threat to corporations and capital markets. Fraud triggers enforcement
actions based in federal criminal and civil statutes, such as the mail,
wire, and securities fraud statutes.27 Criminal and civil enforcement
actions deter harmful conduct by increasing the “price” of
wrongdoing,28 and communicate society’s moral condemnation of the
deceptive behavior that causes investors economic harm.
What the antifraud statutes do not do, however, is parse
(Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012).
24. “[C]orporations . . . are encouraged, and granted rights because they serve the goal of
promoting overall societal wealth.” Steven M.H. Wallman, Understanding the Purpose of a
Corporation: An Introduction, 24 J.CORP. L. 807, 810 (1999) (arguing that corporations exist to
benefit society as a whole).
25. Economists view corporate crime through the eyes of the individual: “Corporate
crimes are not committed by corporations; they are committed by agents of the corporation.”
Arlen, supra note 6, at 834; see also Sharon Oded, Inducing Corporate Compliance: A
Compound Corporate Liability Regime, 31 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 272, 274 (2011) (agreeing
that individual agents commit corporate crimes, but arguing that corporations must be held
responsible in part to ensure adequate deterrence). By contrast, sociologists and organizational
theorists perceive corporate crime as the product of organizational and cultural factors. See,
e.g., James A. Fanto, Recognizing the “Bad Barrel” in Public Business Firms: Social and
Organizational Factors in Misconduct by Senior Decision-Makers, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 1
(2009) (examining the “importance of group and organizational factors in senior-level
misconduct within the firm”); Edward L. Rubin, Images of Organizations and Consequences of
Regulation, 6 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 347, 348 (2005) (comparing and explaining different
models).
26. See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 5, at 308–10 (discussing agency costs).
27. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1348 (2006); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78ff(a) (2006).
28. “[T]he economists’ response to how to deter misconduct is to price any misbehavior.
Assuming the entity and its agents are rational economic actors, misbehavior will occur only
when its expected utility exceeds the disutility of its accompanying punishment.” James D.
Cox, Private Litigation and the Deterrence of Corporate Misconduct, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 1997, at 1, 2.
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opportunism and temporal inconsistency. Instead, they more or less
presume some basic level of planning by which defendants take
advantage of others. For example, the mail, wire, and securities fraud
statutes29 all punish an individual’s participation in a “scheme to
defraud,”30 and yet make no distinction between meticulously planned
and executed schemes and hastily-slapped-together schemes.31
Indeed, even the word “scheme” is misleading, as a spur-of-themoment misrepresentation of material fact satisfies the securities
fraud statute, and also arguably meets the definition of the term
“scheme” for both mail and wire fraud prosecutions.32
Modern-day jurists and scholars have focused almost exclusively
on the intended meaning of the mens rea component of the fraud
statutes, such as whether fraud requires intentional or merely reckless
behavior,33 and whether the harm caused must be economic, or should
29. The federal mail and wire fraud statutes criminalize an individual’s intentional
participation in a “scheme or artifice to defraud” another of his property, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341,
1343, 1348(1), or “intangible right to honest services.” Id. § 1346. The mail and wire fraud
statutes further criminalize a scheme that has the purpose of “obtaining money or property by
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.” Id. §§ 1341, 1343,
1348(2).
30. Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881,
891 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j), outlaws any “manipulative [or] deceptive device” and
authorizes the SEC’s Rule 10b-5, which makes it illegal for any person to “employ any device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud” or “[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading” or “[t]o engage in any act,
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013).
Federal prosecutors may charge violations of Rule 10b-5 criminally when the prohibited
conduct is “willful.” 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).
31. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines previously provided a “more than minimal planning”
sentence enhancement for crimes that involved either “repeated acts” or attempts at
concealment, thus suggesting that statutory fraud could arise from “minimal” planning. See
Frank O. Bowman, III, Pour encourager les autres? The Curious History and Distressing
Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Sentencing
Guidelines Amendments that Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373, 386 n.79 (2004). After the
enhancement became so commonplace that it was meaningless, the Sentencing Commission
eliminated it in 2001. See id. at 407.
32. See supra note 29; see also, e.g., United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547, 550 n.3 (2d
Cir. 1997) (rejecting defendant’s claim that a “simple . . . smuggling” scheme “without an
allegation of misrepresentation or deceit” did not meet the definition of wire fraud statute);
United States v. Herzig, 26 F.2d 487, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1928) (“A scheme to defraud may be
simple in its plan and execution, or it may be elaborate and may require a wide-spread
campaign involving many victims.”).
33. The federal criminal mail and wire fraud statutes require that the government prove
that the defendant “knowingly and willfully participated in the scheme or artifice to
defraud . . . with specific intent to defraud.” 2 LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL
JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CRIMINAL ¶ 44.01, at 444 (2002) (Instruction 44-3).
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include intangible harms such as harm to one’s right to “honest
services.”34 One rarely sees, however, an extended discussion of the
differences between well-planned deception and spur-of-the-moment
fraud.35 By contrast, courts and legislatures have long recognized and
debated the “heat of passion” doctrine for homicide, as well as the
relevance of premeditation for grading homicide offenses.36 For fraud,
however, none of these gradations have made their way into federal
criminal statutes. A scheme to defraud is all that is needed.
Admittedly, pragmatists have good reason to reject statutory
distinctions. A two-tiered approach that imposed stronger sanctions
on “premeditated fraud” could potentially trigger a series of false
positives and negatives, as well as increased litigation and associated
administrative costs. Defendants might (falsely) claim that their
frauds were the result of momentary willpower lapses, whereas
prosecutors would be tempted to see all frauds as well planned. More
importantly, jurists might encounter difficulty defining the term
“premeditation,” particularly for frauds in which a defendant initially
engaged in wrongdoing due to a willpower lapse, but then continued
the fraud for some period of time, either to cover up his original lapse,
or to take further advantage of others.37
Accordingly, by accident or design, we have a general law of fraud
that requires participation in a scheme, or, in the securities context,
either an “untrue statement of . . . material fact” or conduct that
“would operate as a fraud or deceit on any person” in connection with
the purchase or sale of a security.38 In addition, participation in the
proscribed conduct must be “willful” for criminal liability or at least
“reckless” for civil liability.39 The underlying temporal context in
34. See, e.g., Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2931 (2010) (describing schemes
that fit into the “honest services” doctrine). For a critique of the opinion’s treatment of “honest
services,” see generally Samuel W. Buell, The Court’s Fraud Dud, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 31 (2010).
35. Presumably, even a spur-of-the-moment deception would fall within that category of
wrongs that Professor Samuel Buell labels “core” fraud, which comprises an offender’s
intentional deception of another person in order to cause that victim “to do or to relinquish
something voluntarily that the victim otherwise would not do.” Samuel W. Buell, What is
Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 526 (2011).
36. See SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 436–37 (9th ed.
2012) (discussing the relevance of premeditation). For a discussion on provocation and its role
in the “legislative grading” of intentional homicide offenses, see id. at 427–63.
37. Some of these problems have caused observers to question the imposition of harsher
punishment for “premeditated” murders. See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Plotting
Premeditation’s Demise, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 86 (2012) (arguing that
premeditation “is woefully under- and overinclusive”).
38. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013).
39. The Supreme Court has never fully explained the scienter requirement for Rule 10b-5
securities fraud claims, and lower courts have failed to define with any consistency the term
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which the fraud arose is only of interest, if at all, to the court
exercising discretion at sentencing.40
Even if criminal fraud statutes fail to parse timing and motivation,
there is no reason that internal corporate law enforcers should also fail
to do so. Punishment and prevention, after all, are very different
concepts; the tools we find most effective for one may not be the ones
we find most effective for the other. Accordingly, this Part attempts to
unpack these two dispositions.
A. Opportunistic Agents
Economists define an agent as any person who has been delegated
authority by a principal to act on the principal’s behalf.41 Although
agency-cost theory has long been a focus of those who study
corporations, the concept has been used to analyze other relationships,
such as between public decision makers and the general public.42
Although the foundational conflict between corporate managers and
shareholders is often described as an agency-cost problem, the label
refers primarily to agency theory as opposed to the common law of

“willfulness” as it is used in the criminal securities fraud context. Buell, supra note 35, at 555–
60 (examining numerous attempts by lower courts to define the term). Thus, the difference
between “reckless” and “willful” misconduct varies depending on the court. Compare United
States v. Gansman, 657 F.3d 85, 91 n.7 (2d Cir. 2011) (opining in dicta that, unlike criminal
liability, civil liability can attach “if the government proves . . . that the defendant’s conduct
was merely reckless, rather than willful”), with United States v. Tarallo, 380 F.3d 1174, 1188–
89 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding jury instruction that permitted conviction of defendant if he made
a representation “with reckless indifference to its truth or falsity”).
40. In United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), the district
court justified its decision to impose a sentence well below the range recommended by the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines in part because “Adelson . . . feared the effects of exposing what he had
belatedly learned.” For a recent analysis of how courts approach white-collar sentencing, see
generally Todd Haugh, Sentencing the Why of White Collar Crime, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
(forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2244569.
41. “[A]n ‘agency problem’—in the most general sense of the term—arises whenever the
welfare of one party, termed the ‘principal,’ depends upon actions taken by another party,
termed the ‘agent.’” Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal
Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE & FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
21, 21 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2004). For the differences between economic and legal
agents, see Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Fiduciary Duties: The Emerging
Jurisprudence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 133, 135
(Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012) (“Under the economics definition directors
are agents of shareholders, while under the legal definition they are not because shareholders
lack the requisite control.”).
42. “[The agency cost problem] exists in all organizations and in all cooperative
efforts—at every level of management in firms, in universities, in mutual companies, in
cooperatives, in governmental authorities and bureaus, in unions, and in . . . agency
relationships . . . .” Jensen & Meckling, supra note 5, at 309 (citation omitted).
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agency.43
Throughout the agency-cost literature, the narrative is roughly the
same: those with decision-making authority (i.e., agents) employ their
authority and discretion in a manner that benefits themselves at the
expense of the people who employ them (i.e., principals).44 Within the
publicly held corporation, the separation of ownership and control
enables managers to take advantage of uninformed and disorganized
shareholders.45 Agents harm their principals by being opportunistic
and by “shirking.”46 Shirking encompasses instances in which an
agent fails to “devote significant effort” to the tasks delegated by his
principal.47
Opportunism is more difficult to define.48 It is a pejorative term
that suggests a type of behavior that combines self-interest, deception,
and a willingness to exploit some set of rules. It is, according to
Oliver Williamson’s famous definition, a form of self-interest seeking
with guile.49 Guile, in turn, implies an intention to disguise the nature
43. Fiduciaries, directors, and officers are not the corporate shareholders’ common law
agents. See, e.g., D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 699–
700 (2013) (distinguishing corporate fiduciary relationships from common law agency
relationships).
44. “The heart of the dilemma comes from a simple truth: it is expensive (and ultimately
impossible) to prevent parties from taking self-interested actions when they are given control
over other people’s money.” George S. Geis, The Space Between Markets and Hierarchies, 95
VA. L. REV. 99, 110 (2009).
45. “Much of the corporate governance in the United States focuses on . . . utilizing
different monitoring devices available to protect shareholders from losses resulting from the
separation of ownership from control.” Arthur R. Pinto, An Overview of United States
Corporate Governance in Publicly Traded Corporations, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 257, 260 (2010).
46. “[T]he agent has an incentive to act opportunistically, skimping on the quality of his
performance, or even diverting to himself some of what was promised to the principal.”
Hansman & Kraakman, supra note 41, at 21 (citation omitted).
47. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 5, at 313. “[S]hirking is defined to include any
action by a member of a production team that diverges from the interests of the team as a
whole. . . . [It] includes not only culpable cheating, but also negligence, oversight, incapacity,
and even honest mistakes.” STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE 73 n.94 (2008). Extreme shirking is addressed by the fiduciary duty of
care. Ordinary mismanagement is taken up, if at all, through markets and private contract. See,
e.g., Mark J. Roe, Abstract, Corporate Law’s Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 233 (2002)
(observing that “the business judgment rule puts beyond direct legal inquiry most key agency
costs—such as overexpansion, overinvestment, and reluctance to take on profitable but
uncomfortable risks”).
48. For more on the difficulties of defining opportunism, see Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic
Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1653–54 (2011).
49. Oliver E. Williamson, The Logic of Economic Organization, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 65,
68 (1988); see also Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 41, at 21 n.2 (defining opportunism as
“self-interested behavior that involves some element of deception, misrepresentation, or bad
faith”). Despite Professor Williamson’s widely accepted definition, not all opportunistic
behavior is in fact guileful or deceptive. For example, Williamson’s famous “hold-up”
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of one’s conduct or to deceive. It is this notion of guile or deception
that implies a level of self-awareness that is itself dangerous—the
individual knows she is doing something the other person might not
like and she therefore has the incentive and ability to cover her tracks.
Williamson’s guile-based definition of opportunism coincides
nicely with popular definitions of white-collar crime. The FBI, for
example, has defined white-collar crime as acts that “are
characterized by deceit, concealment, or violation of trust.”50 The
guileful, deceptive behavior that underlies so-called schemes to
defraud also defeats markets and undermines the public’s trust.51 It is
both so morally blameworthy and so economically harmful as to
justify the government’s intrusion in otherwise private affairs and to
trigger promises from public officials to publicly condemn and strip
officers of their worldly possessions.52 Accordingly, even though
agency costs have long been the “domain of state corporate law,”53
managerial opportunism has increasingly become the preoccupation
of federal and state prosecutors and regulators.54 Although state courts
may have initially crafted doctrines such as the duty of loyalty with
antifraud norms in mind,55 corporate law has ceded much of antifraud
enforcement to federal and state enforcement actors.56
example—whereby an owner of relation-specific assets takes advantage of a contracting party
who has no other options—is not necessarily guileful or underhanded. See, e.g., Oliver Hart, An
Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1762–63 (1989)
(explaining Williamson’s hold-up theory).
50. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: A
REPORT TO THE PUBLIC 3 (1989).
51. For a discussion of the economic justification for criminalizing fraud, see Richard A.
Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1195–96 (1985)
(offering “market bypass” justifications for crimes such as fraud and theft).
52. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives “Naked,
Homeless and Without Wheels”: Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies, and the Debate over
Entity Versus Individual Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627, 627 (2007). Langevoort was
quoting former SEC Chairman Richard Breeden. See id.
53. Donald C. Langevoort, Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley: Revisiting Corporate
Law’s “Duty of Care as Responsibility for Systems,” 31 J. CORP. L. 949, 964 (2006).
Langevoort observes that statutes such as the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act “creat[e] a much
harsher criminal and civil liability threat if [managerial] noncompliance is detected by the SEC
or federal prosecutors.” Id. at 966.
54. See, e.g., Kulbir Walha & Edward E. Filusch, Eliot Spitzer: A Crusader Against
Corporate Malfeasance or a Politically Ambitious Spotlight Hound? A Case Study of Eliot
Spitzer and Marsh & McLennan, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1111, 1112 (2005) (discussing
Spitzer’s use of New York’s Martin Act to threaten criminal cases against corporations and
their employees).
55. See, e.g., Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944) (explaining that the
duty of loyalty’s purpose is “to avoid the possibility of fraud and to avoid the temptation of
self-interest” (quoting In re Ryan’s Will, 52 N.E.2d 909, 923 (N.Y. 1943))).
56. For more on the “federalization” of corporate law and corporate governance in
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Corporate criminal behavior—particularly securities fraud—is an
agency cost, albeit one that makes some shareholders better off.57 All
things being equal, shareholders prefer not to be defrauded in their
investments. True, some shareholders may benefit temporarily from
the corporate officer’s decision to fraudulently inflate profits.58 But
over time, fraud reduces confidence in public markets, decreases
allocative efficiency, and increases the corporation’s cost of securing
needed capital.59 Accordingly, officers who commit fraud impose
long-term costs on themselves, their employees, and the many
shareholders who are likely to get caught paying the bill when various
violations of law finally come to light.60
Admittedly, not all opportunistic behavior is covered by federal
criminal or securities laws. The Supreme Court’s narrowing of
“honest services” fraud in Skilling v. United States now leaves
particular, see generally Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate
Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 872–86 (2003) and Mark J.
Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003).
57. See, e.g., Arlen, supra note 6, at 834. For an early argument that corporate fraud is a
type of agency cost, see Jennifer H. Arlen and William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud
on Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 701–03 (theorizing that
officers and directors defraud markets to save their jobs, at the expense of corporate
shareholders). For later analyses, see Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The
Attempt to Reform Wall Street by the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act,
2012 BYU L. REV. 73, 106 (quoting Rose, supra note 4, at 2182) (ascribing securities fraud to
“opportunities” and “pressures” that are exacerbated by corporate agency costs).
58. Day traders, for example, may benefit from fraud insofar as they sell stock while it is
inflated. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on
Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1559–60 (2006) (discussing
incipient conflict between professional traders and undiversified, “buy and hold” investors,
who “are more likely to have purchased their stock before the class period commenced”). Buy
and hold investors, however, are likely to suffer. Id. at 1560. Moreover, as Professor Alicia
Davis Evans explains, the average investor loses more money on disclosed frauds than he gains
from undisclosed frauds. Alicia Davis Evans, The Investor Compensation Fund, 33 J. CORP. L.
223, 229 (2007).
59. Rose, supra note 4, at 2179–80 (explaining securities fraud’s effects on the stock
market’s ability to reflect accurate prices and thus steer capital away from its most efficient
use); see also James J. Park, Rule 10B-5 and the Rise of the Unjust Enrichment Principle, 60
DUKE L.J. 345, 355–56 (2010) (citing literature discussing securities fraud’s allocative and
informational effects).
60. For example, Professor Usha Rodrigues portrays corporate fraud as a conflict of
interest problem: “Even as the Enron and Worldcom frauds gave way to fresher tales of options
backdating, corporate looting, insider trading, and more recently out-sized golden parachutes,
the common denominator remained the fact that corporate agents put their own interests above
those of the corporation.” Rodrigues, supra note 5, at 3 (emphasis added). Others observe that
corporate fraud victimizes stakeholders beyond those who meet the narrow legal definition of
“principal.” See Urska Velikonja, The Cost of Securities Fraud, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1887,
1945 (2013) (arguing that fraud affects economic decision-making among firms more broadly,
not just shareholders in a specific corporation whose officers misstated earnings).
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nondisclosures of conflicts of interests outside the boundaries of
federal criminal law.61 Other conflicts of interest—such as those that
arise in the merger context, where managers attempt to fend off
takeovers partially to preserve their own positions—are the subject of
state corporate law.62 Nevertheless, much of what we think of as
opportunistic behavior within a firm (e.g., deceitful behavior that
causes victims to lose tangible interests such as money) still rests
comfortably within the criminal law paradigm.63
B. Deterring Opportunistic Behavior
Since opportunistic agents are presumptively rational, their
misconduct can be deterred.64 Deterrence, in turn, depends on the
putative wrongdoer’s cost–benefit analysis.65 When the expected
sanction for misconduct, multiplied by the probability of punishment,
outweighs its net expected benefits, the would-be wrongdoer desists.66
A separate strand of this literature recognizes that legal institutions
can reduce wrongdoing by altering the wrongdoer’s preferences or
tastes for engaging in wrongdoing.67 In either case, the law
enforcement institution reduces fraud by adding to the would-be
wrongdoer’s costs or by reducing his expected benefits.
61. See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2931–32 (2010) (limiting definition of
“honest services fraud” statute to include only bribery and kickbacks, and not nondisclosure of
conflicts of interests).
62. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985)
(discussing the “enhanced duty” that results because of the “omnipresent specter that a board
may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its
shareholders”).
63. “A century ago, lying raised moral and reputational questions but only rarely legal
ones. Today, lying by any government official or lying in the course of any business transaction
is usually a felony.” William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1881–82
(2000).
64. See, e.g., Arlen & Carney, supra note 57, at 701–03. For more recent accounts of
how fraud reflects as agency costs, see for example Harry First, Branch Office of the
Prosecutor: The New Role of the Corporation in Business Crime Prosecutions, 89 N.C. L. REV.
23 (2010) and Urska Velikonja, Leverage, Sanctions, and Deterrence of Accounting Fraud, 44
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1281 (2011).
65. For the seminal discussion of this point, see Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment:
An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 176–79 (1968) (explaining the “supply” of
offenses) and Oded, supra note 25, at 273 (citing authorities).
66. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 51, 1205–14 (discussing the optimal criminal penalties
to deter crime); Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions
as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1241–46 (1985) (noting that a party would not be
“deterred from committing an act if his expected private benefits exceed the disutility of the
highest conceivable expected sanction”). See generally Becker, supra note 65.
67. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a
Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 (setting forth “an economic analysis of
criminal law as a preference-shaping policy”).
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Although Professor Gary Becker’s seminal account of crime treats
sanctions and enforcement probability as substitutes, subsequent
deterrence theory scholarship has demonstrated that criminals pay
greater attention to increases in probability of punishment than
increases in sanctions.68 Moreover, punishment’s timing plays a big
role in its overall effectiveness. Disutility that occurs in later periods
is felt less keenly than disutility experienced immediately.
Accordingly, the more remote a sanction is in terms of time, the more
weakly it deters.69
A different strand of deterrence theory recognizes the importance
of the corporate firm. The firm functions as a mediating entity: it can
either diffuse responsibility for wrongdoing, or it can aid external
authorities through self-monitoring and reporting.70 Accordingly, as
Professors Jennifer Arlen and Reinier Kraakman argue, the best way
to reduce organizational wrongdoing is to create a two-tiered scheme
of liability for organizations, whereby the organizations can earn
reduced sanctions for their employees’ wrongdoing by monitoring
and self-reporting misconduct to external authorities.71 Corporations
that maintain robust compliance programs thus experience reduced
penalties, whereas corporations that forego aggressive monitoring
suffer more severe sanctions if they are caught.72
As those familiar with the agency-cost literature well know,
lawmakers and private individuals have devised numerous ways to
reduce corporate agency costs.73 Nevertheless, the tools most
associated with the reduction of corporate fraud are criminal and civil
liability, with criminal liability increasingly seen as the more robust
mechanism for addressing fraud and similar types of wrongdoing.74
68. See Becker, supra note 65; see also Miriam H. Baer, Linkage and the Deterrence of
Corporate Fraud, 94 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1303–06 & n.38 (offering reasons why increasing the
probability of punishment may be more effective than increasing sanctions).
69. See generally Yair Listokin, Crime and (with a Lag) Punishment: The Implications of
Discounting for Equitable Sentencing, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 115, 116 (2007).
70. See Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613,
1625–27 (2007).
71. See generally Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate
Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997); Arlen,
supra note 6.
72. For an argument that the federal government has failed to effectively implement this
two-tiered scheme, see generally Jennifer Arlen, The Failure of the Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 321 (2012).
73. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 41, at 23–28 (dividing various approaches into
ex ante and ex post “regulatory” and “governance” strategies).
74. For a comprehensive argument that civil liability fails to deter corporate fraud due to
the shielding effects of director and officer liability insurance, see generally TOM BAKER &
SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW LIABILITY INSURANCE
UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION (2010). For other critiques of civil liability, see
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C. Temporally Inconsistent Decision Makers
Many, if not all of us, have experienced the phenomenon whereby
at T0, we promise to take one course of action in the future, only to
later reverse that course of action at T1, and then express regret at T2
for not having adhered to our original plans. The decisions we claim
that we will make later are not the actual choices we make when
“later” arrives, and in many cases, we regret our failure to adhere to
our original plans. Psychologists and behavioral economists have
devised several explanations for this phenomenon, which are
discussed below.
1. Hyperbolic Discounting
The hyperobolic discounting literature theorizes that indivdiuals
change their minds suddenly because they discount costs and benefits
differently depending on how close a given time interval is to the
present.75 If asked to choose between a slice of pizza at an earlier
point in time and two slices just one hour later, a person feels
differently about the hour-long waiting period (and the extra slice) if
that period commences now or is slated to commence one week from
now.76 Far-off tradeoffs are perceived differently from imminent
ones.77 As a result, given the choice between a single slice of pizza at
5:00 PM next Thursday or two slices at 6:00 PM, a student may very
happily agree today to wait just one additional hour for an extra slice
of pizza. When “next Thursday” becomes today, however, and a
single slice is a mere five minutes away, she is apt to change her
mind.
generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence
and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534 (2006); Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and
the Breakdown of the Board: Promoting Accountability in Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA L.
REV. 105 (2006).
75. See, e.g., Preface to CHOICE OVER TIME (George Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds.,
1992) (collecting papers on intertemporal choice); see also George Loewenstein & Richard H.
Thaler, Anomalies: Intertemporal Choice, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1989, at 181, 182–83 (offering
common examples of hyperbolic discounting). For more technical treatments, see generally
David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. ECON. 443 (1997) and R.H.
Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization, 23 REV. ECON. STUD. 165
(1956).
76. “When faced with a choice between an inferior early option and a superior later
option, hyperbolic discounters will tend to prefer the later, superior option, when both are
remote, but switch to a preference for the earlier, inferior option as both approach in time.”
CHOICE OVER TIME, supra note 75, at xiii; see also Loewenstein & Thaler, supra note 75, at
181–83 (explaining mathematical principles behind time inconsistency).
77. Scholars sometimes refer to this as “declining impatience” since impatience declines
for more remote time periods. See Yusuke Kinari, Fumio Ohtake & Yoshiro Tsutsui, Time
Discounting: Declining Impatience and Interval Effect, 39 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 87, 88
(2009) (explaining usage of the term).
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Psychologists and behavioral economists have labeled this
phenomenon “hyperbolic discounting.”78 Conventional rational-actor
models assume that individuals discount time exponentially,
according to a stable “discount.”79 Thus, for the rational actor, it does
not matter when the wait for two slices of pizza begins. Although she
would prefer pizza now to pizza later (as any rational person would),
she nevertheless assigns the same value to the one-hour wait (and to
the extra slice of pizza), regardless of when that wait commences.
Hyperbolic discounters, by contrast, impose a steeper discount on
intervals that occur closest to the present than to intervals slated to
occur in the future.80 As Professor Oren Bar-Gill explains, “[A]t a
given point in time, t, a hyperbolic discounter heavily discounts costs
and benefits that will materialize in the near future, at t+1, but assigns
only a smaller additional discount for costs (and benefits) that will
materialize in the more distant future, at t+2.”81
Individuals who are unaware of this tendency incorrectly predict
their future behavior.82 We think that we can wait an additional hour
for a much-anticipated televised sporting event to begin, but when the
additional hour arrives, the wait feels more costly, and as a result, we
change our plans.83
Hyperbolic discounting is particularly problematic for conduct that
generates positive and negative consequences in different periods.
True, even rational individuals judge immediate costs or benefits
more strongly than equivalent costs or benefits that arise in later
periods. But hyperbolic discounters place a much greater premium on
near-term costs and benefits, which makes them more likely to put off
(and ultimately abandon) activities that feature upfront costs, and to
excessively and prematurely consume activities that feature upfront
78. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to
Law & Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1539–40 (1998) (contrasting hyperbolic
discounting with exponential discounting); Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now
or Later, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 103, 106 n.7 (1999).
79. Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 1043.
80. “When considering trade-offs between two future moments, present-biased
preferences give stronger relative weight to the earlier moment as it gets closer.” O’Donoghue
& Rabin, supra note 78, at 103; see also Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals, supra note 18, at 641.
81. Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction By Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1396 (2004).
82. “When a hyperbolic discounter is naïve about the nature of her time preferences, she
will overestimate her will-power . . . .” Id. at 81, at 1396 (explaining why consumers
excessively borrow money); see also Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals, supra note 18, at 612.
83. Conduct changes when preferences change. Plotted on a graph, this is the moment
that the individual’s future and present preference curves “cross.” “[D]iscount curves that cross
as a function of time alone do not arise from the conventional, exponential form of
discounting.” George Ainslie & Nick Haslam, Hyperbolic Discounting, in CHOICE OVER TIME,
supra note 75, at 57, 63. For more on preference switches generally, see Korobkin & Ulen,
supra note 13, at 1127–43.
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benefits.84
The hyperbolic discounting literature is concededly messy. Some
disagree on when it occurs and others on how to model it.85
Researchers have identified a stronger effect on discounts when the
interval is framed as a delay of gains as opposed to a delay of losses,
and the magnitude of the effect increases for smaller amounts.86
Finally, some researchers argue that hyperbolic discounting does not
accurately predict behavior beyond an initial interval, and therefore
reflects little more than a visceral reaction.87
One need not definitely resolve these debates, as most researchers
agree that individuals harbor some type of immediacy bias, and that
they alter their conduct in ways that conflict with their previously
stated intentions.88 Regardless of whether we attribute this switch to
hyperbolic discounting or other phenomena, the switch presents a
problem for policymakers and law enforcers.89
2. Willpower and Self-Control Problems
Many individuals discount hyperbolically, but not everyone acts in
accordance with his or her altered preferences.90 Some people stick to
their T0 plans, even at T1. We often say (quite approvingly) that these
84. Utset, supra note 8, at 419 n.6, 420.
85. See, e.g., Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein, Conflicting Motives in
Evaluations of Sequences, 37 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 221, 221–22 (2008) (acknowledging a
lack of consensus among researchers). Professor Daniel Read argues that individuals are
“subadditive” in that they impose smaller discounts on longer delays than they do on a sum of
shorter delays. See Daniel Read, Is Time-Discounting Hyperbolic or Subadditive?, 23 J. RISK &
UNCERTAINTY 5 (2001) (demonstrating through experiments that declining discounts are due
solely to subadditivity and not hyperbolic discounting). In response, researchers contend that
Read failed to test for hyperbolic discounting over shorter delays. See Kinari et al., supra note
77 (isolating “interval” and “delay” effects and demonstrating “hyperbolic discounting” for
shorter delays while also establishing subadditivity for longer delays).
86. Loewenstein & Thaler, supra note 75, at 184.
87. Read, supra note 85, at 28 (arguing that “[a]n immediacy effect is not declining
impatience, but rather a one-time-only charge for delaying consumption”). Read further argues
that hyperbolic preferences respond mostly to “visceral” emotions, such as hunger, and that the
use of money in his experiments was proper because money “may have some visceral
properties, [but] this is not its primary characteristic.” Id. at 27.
88. As Professors Fennell and Stark argue, “While there may be questions about how
well the hyperbolic discount function tracks the dynamics of preference reversals, it usefully
captures the idea that lack of self-control can undo previously preferred plans . . . .” Lee Anne
Fennell & Kirk J. Stark, Taxation over Time, 59 TAX L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2005) (footnote
omitted).
89. Jolls et al., supra note 78, at 1539–40 (discussing the implication of hyperbolic
discounting for “effective deterrence of criminal behavior”).
90. Fennell, Willpower Taxes, supra note 12, at 1378 (observing that although hyperbolic
discounting is often “symptomatic” of willpower lapses, the phenomenon does not “inevitably
signify” such lapses).
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individuals possess substantial willpower.91 Professor Lee Anne
Fennell defines this elusive ability as “one’s personal efficacy in
carrying out the consumption path that one (from a cool, reflective,
composite, or long-run perspective) deems to be the best of those that
lie open.”92
People who are unable to adhere to their long-term plans are often
said to lack self-control.93 As Professor Richard McAdams and
Professor Fennell have (separately) pointed out, the naïve person who
lacks self-control in a particular moment differs significantly from the
myopic individual who maintains a uniformly high discount rate.94
The myopic person does not burden herself with long-term plans and
therefore experiences no regret when she changes her mind.95 The
hyperbolic person, by contrast, sincerely embarks upon beneficial,
long-term projects, but later abandons them when temptations
overwhelm her.96 Unlike her impulsive friend, the hyperbolic
individual desires and assumes she will behave like the dependable
person with the relatively low discount rate, but for some reason, she
loses the ability to do so when changes in utility become imminent.97
Aside from hyperbolic discounting and willpower lapses,
researchers have posed additional explanations for preference
switching. The study of emotions has led some to adopt a “hot and
cold” explanation of behavior. The “cold state” can dispassionately
calculate and net out long-term costs and benefits, whereas the “hot
state” abandons this rational framework.98 As a result, the cold,
rational self chooses a long-term option that yields long-term benefits.
The hot, emotional self undoes the cold self’s plans, causing regret
(and often serious costs) later on.99 And, as is the case with hyperbolic
discounting, the cold self underestimates the likelihood and effect that
his emotions will cause him to make poor decisions at some later
91. For an extended treatment of the subject and summary of Roy Baumeister’s and other
psychologists’ studies on willpower, see generally ROY F. BAUMEISTER & JOHN TIERNEY,
WILLPOWER (2011).
92. Fennell, Willpower Taxes, supra note 12, at 1376–77 (footnote omitted).
93. Id. at 1377 (observing that “willpower relates to individuals’ subjective optimization
efforts”).
94. Id. at 1378–79; McAdams, Signaling, supra note 18, at 657.
95. See McAdams, Signaling, supra note 18, at 656 (observing that feelings of regret will
be felt solely by the persons with inconsistent discount rates and not those with uniformly high
discount rates).
96. See Fennell, Willpower Taxes, supra note 12, at 1378–79.
97. See id.
98. George Loewenstein, Emotions in Economic Theory and Economic Behavior, 90 AM.
ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 426, 428 (2000) (“[V]isceral factors often drive people to behave
in ways that they view as contrary to their own self-interest.”). For a detailed account of how
hot and cold states impact decision-making, see Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 18, at 527–29.
99. See Loewenstein, supra note 98, at 428.
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point in time.100
Finally, Professor Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff’s recent discussion
of construal-level theory offers a slightly different explanation for
preference switches.101 According to this theory, an individual
estimates the costs or benefits of a far-off event differently depending
on whether she views the event “abstractly” in the future (high-level
construal) or “concretely” in the present (low-level construal).102 As
the event becomes more imminent, costs or benefits of a given
activity appear more acute.103 As Professor Hollander-Blumoff’s
account demonstrates, the concrete, near-term calculation is not
necessarily more accurate; it is simply felt more strongly.104
Construal-level theory thus explains why an individual might commit
to a goal or obligation, later decide that it is too onerous, and yet feel
regret afterward when she fails to follow through on her original
plan.105
Whether the explanation revolves around willpower lapses, hot
and cold states, or abstract and concrete reasoning, the outcome is the
same: people desire certain long-term commitments, and then view
the associated costs and benefits of those commitments differently as
decisions move from the future to the present. As a result, they act in
ways they would not have predicted in the past, and then experience
regret once they change course.
D. Reducing Temporal Inconsistency
The temporal inconsistency literature identifies primarily two
types of problems, procrastination and excessive or premature
consumption.106 As Professors Ted O’Donoghue and Matthew Rabin
explain: “You procrastinate—wait when you should do it—if actions
involve immediate costs (writing a paper), and preoperate—do it
100. “[P]eople tend to underestimate the impact of visceral factors on their own current
and future behavior.” Id. “When in a ‘cold’ state . . . , it is difficult to imagine what it would
feel like to be in a ‘hot’ state or to imagine how one might behave in such a state [and vice
versa].” Id.
101. Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 18, at 529–33.
102. Id. at 529–30.
103. Id. at 530 (“[L]ow-level construals capture the concrete, specific, mundane features
of the event.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
104. See id. at 530 (noting that high-level, abstract construal “helps individuals exercise
self-control”).
105. See id. at 532 (explaining that “the events are not just weighted [differently], they are
also conceptualized differently”).
106. See Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals, supra note 18, at 644–45 (discussing how
procrastination and overconsumption can generate crime). Some might ask what the difference
is between the procrastinator and the person who wholly abandons the project. The
procrastinator still thinks she will eventually do the project even though she keeps putting it
off.
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when you should wait—if actions involve immediate rewards . . . .”107
Both types of conduct impose costs on individuals and third parties.
Professor Manuel Utset applies these concepts to the corporate
context and argues that a temporally inconsistent corporate manager
may either procrastinate engaging in valuable projects or otherwise
“overconsume” misbehavior.108 The tendency to procrastinate and
overconsume, in turn, generates corporate wrongdoing, by serving as
either the cause of corporate wrongdoing or as the condition that
precedes such wrongdoing.109
Consider the evils of procrastination: Kathy, a regional district
manager, agrees to meet a sales target set by her supervisor. She must
meet that target by next month, and to achieve that target, she agrees
that she should reorganize her sales team. But the reorganization,
which she previously agreed was necessary and valuable, requires an
upfront investment in time and social capital. Accordingly, every day,
Kathy puts off her planned reorganization; she plans to do it
eventually, but she cannot bring herself to do it “today.” At the end of
the month, Kathy has no choice but to lie or accept a negative
performance review. If Kathy chooses to lie, we can say that
procrastination has played a role in her fraud.
Now consider the evils of overconsumption: Jennifer, a corporate
compliance officer, suspects the IT group of filing fraudulent expense
reports. When she questions the top Chief Information Officer, he
provides her with superficially plausible explanations for his group’s
previous reports. Jennifer ought to spend time investigating and
questioning the reports, but the immediate benefits of closing out her
investigation appear too tempting. As a result she accepts the CIO’s
explanation without a follow-up. Jennifer has effectively
“overconsumed” an immediate benefit.
The temporal inconsistency literature contends that we can solve
the foregoing problems by enacting so-called precommitment devices,
which have been defined as “any action by which the present self
constrains the choices of the future self.”110 One can do this either by
107. O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 78, at 104.
108. Presumably, a hyperbolic person could harm his longer-term self by either premature
consumption or excessive consumption. Compare id., with Utset, Hyberbolic Criminals, supra
note 18. Utset refers to the latter as a form of “nibbling opportunism,” but for reasons set out
later, this Article prefers to treat the term “opportunistic” as referring to one’s motivation,
which is separate from one’s tendency to be consistent or inconsistent. Compare Utset,
Hyperbolic Criminals, supra note 18, at 644, with infra Part II.
109. Utset, supra note 8, at 432–36 (explaining how temporal inconsistency affects both
corporate managers and those “gatekeepers” tasked with monitoring said managers).
110. McAdams, Signaling, supra note 18, at 657. Professor Stephen Bainbridge sets forth
four “precommitment” strategies, which include the deletion of options, increasing the costs of
choosing certain options, delays or cooling-off periods, and insulation from knowledge of
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creating mechanisms that accelerate costs and benefits the very
moment the decision maker is apt to yield to her short-term
temptations, or by implementing devices that explicitly reduce
options in advance of a foreseen event.111 A tool that falls within the
former category is a “targeted enforcement device,” and a tool that
falls within the latter category is an “option-reducing device.”
Targeted enforcement devices increase the costs of undesirable
behavior either by accelerating sanctions or delaying gratification.112
Unlike ordinary deterrence devices, they impose an external cost or
benefit at exactly the moment an individual is likely to fall prey to
short-term temptations. A nice example is the speed bump; the reason
it stops a driver from speeding is that it forces him to experience the
“costs” of speeding at the very moment he is tempted to place his foot
on the accelerator.113 By the same token, if every time a company
executive wants to take a government client out to dinner, the
executive has to describe the existence and purpose of the dinner in a
memo and demonstrate why it does not violate state or local
procurement laws; the mere fact of having to write the memo imposes
an immediate “cost” on the executive’s behavior. In the moment, she
may not care about being fired or placed in jail months down the road,
but she may so dislike filling out paperwork (or worse, conferring
with her supervisor) that she is deflected from engaging in violations
of bribery and gratuity laws. The accelerated cost (writing a memo) is
more effective than the longer-term cost (being detected and sent to
prison).
The same internal reporting system also makes it easier to track or
prove violations ex post if the employee lies about the purpose of the
dinner, or fails to fill out the memo at all. Thus, a targeted
enforcement device fulfills two functions. It triggers an early
“nonsanction cost” that may deflect an otherwise waffling employee
from falling prey to some short-term desire to bribe a potential

certain options. Bainbridge, supra note 17, at 4–5. Professor John Robertson similarly
describes precommitment devices that work by “removing certain options from the feasible
[decision] set, by making them more costly or available only with a delay, and by insulating
themselves from knowledge about their existence.” Robertson, supra note 16, at 1730 (quoting
JOHN ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITTMENT, AND
CONTRAINTS 1 (2000)).
111. Professor Utset notes that certain provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 were
intended to perform these functions. Utset, supra note 8, at 439–43.
112. See, e.g., Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals, supra note 18, at 657–62 (arguing in favor of
“well-tailored” deterrence approaches that target first-period costs and benefits).
113. See Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax
Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 696 (2007) (praising the speed bump’s qualities in
constraining speeding).
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government client.114 At the same time, it increases the costs of
engaging in criminal conduct for all employees because it increases
the overall likelihood of detection and punishment. The employee
who was planning all along to obtain a government contract through
bribery now must fill out fraudulent paperwork to mask his
behavior.115 Such detection avoidance is costly, even if only
marginally so, and may trigger a separate, independent punishment
for false disclosure.116
Another source of targeted enforcement is the psychic cost that an
individual feels at the moment he is about to falsify records or commit
other types of wrongdoing. Criminologists have demonstrated that
moral inhibitions play a role in reducing crime, including corporate
crime.117 Psychic costs, in turn, arise out of social norms.118
If every time an individual falsifies a document, he feels a sudden
wave of unpleasant emotions (e.g., fear or shame), he will more likely
avoid such behavior.119 The “self-imposed” sanction works not just
because it increases the overall cost of wrongdoing, but also because
114. McAdams, supra note 18, at 1613 (using the term “nonsanction cost” to denote costs
taken by potential criminals in preparing for crime to “lower the probability of detection”).
115. Cf. id. at 1616 (noting that when a “criminal must invest in the crime” before any
benefits accrue, “sanctions for criminal preparation will cause criminals to incur extra costs in
making their preparation to avoid detection”).
116. See id.; Chris William Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1331,
1378–82 (2006) (discussing “piggyback” sanctions employed to punish detected instances of
detection avoidance). Concededly, detection avoidance may be costly to the government
enforcer as well as the offender. Id. at 1353.
117. See Nicole Leeper Piquero, M. Lyn Exum & Sally S. Simpson, Integrating the
Desire-for-Control and Rational Choice in a Corporate Crime Context, 22 JUST. Q. 252, 254
(2005) (citing studies for the proposition that “moral inhibitions consistently have inhibitory
effects on crime”); see also Raymond Paternoster & Sally S. Simpson, Sanction Threats and
Appeals to Morality: Testing a Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime, 30 LAW & SOC’Y
REV. 549, 554 (1996).
118. “Social norms are standards of behavior that are based on widely shared beliefs about
how individual group members ought to behave in a given situation.” Helen Bernhard et al.,
Group Affiliation and Altruistic Norm Enforcement, 96 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 217,
217 (2006); see also J. Mark Ramseyer, The Costs of the Consensual Myth: Antitrust
Enforcement and Institutional Barriers to Litigation in Japan, 94 YALE L.J. 604, 644 (1985)
(describing psychic costs incident to behaving contrary to social norms).
119. See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in
Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 355–57 (1996) (noting that individuals internalize
social norms expressed in criminal laws to avoid discomfort and dissonance associated with
desires to commit violations of such laws). Norms can either be imposed internally (through
conscience or guilt) or externally (through reputational or societal sanction). See Robert D.
Cooter, Three Effects of Social Norms on Law: Expression, Deterrence, and Internalization, 79
OR. L. REV. 1, 6–8 (2000) (discussing the relationship between internalized norms and external
social sanctions); Kahan & Nussbaum, supra, at 356–57. For a study of psychic costs and their
relationship with corruption, see Philip M. Nichols, The Psychic Costs of Violating Corruption
Laws, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 145, 193–95, 198–200 (2012).
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it surfaces at exactly the moment the individual considers engaging in
wrongdoing, and effectively deflects his short-term temptation.120
Temporal inconsistency theory thus provides an additional
explanation for how “norms” improve compliance.121 The regulated
person follows the law not just because she agrees with the law’s
content and finds the lawmaker’s authority “legitimate,”122 but also
because the norm triggers a strong psychic cost—guilt or shame—at
exactly the right time. Certainly, legitimacy matters, but the reason
why it matters is likely bound up with its timing. The psychic cost
behaves like an internal speed bump and deflects the individual’s
short-term temptation to engage in wrongdoing.123
The second type of precommitment device is one that reduces an
individual’s options in advance of a foreseen event. Whereas targeted
enforcement technically leaves intact the option of behaving badly,
option-reducing devices eliminate such discretion.124 They do so
either by removing options or by blocking access to the information
that would cause a decision maker to choose such options.125
The most celebrated example is that of Ulysses, who famously
directed his crewmen to tie him to the mast of his ship and plugged
their ears with wax so that they would not hear his cries when he
heard the Sirens’ song.126 As a result, he and his crewmembers were,
respectively, unable and unaware of any reason to steer the ship in the
120. See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1665 (1996)
(“[S]omeone who has internalized a norm feels guilt from violating it and pride from obeying
it. Consequently, internalization may tip the balance for a decisionmaker in favor of obeying a
norm.” (footnote omitted)); Richard H. McAdams, Group Norms, Gossip, and Blackmail, 144
U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2249–50 (1996) (similar). That being said, an individual may convince
himself that certain behavior, however illegal, does not violate any social norms. See Rapp,
supra note 57, at 106; see also Haugh, supra note 40 (manuscript at 26–34) (drawing on
criminological scholarship regarding “neutralization techniques” that defendants use to assure
themselves that they are not violating social norms).
121. “Normative commitment through personal morality means obeying a law because
one feels the law is just; normative commitment through legitimacy means obeying a law
because one feels that the authority enforcing the law has the right to dictate behavior.” TOM R.
TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 4 (2006).
122. Id.
123. Temporal inconsistency thus may offer researchers additional avenues through which
to test the relative power of social norms as a deterrent.
124. See Bainbridge, supra note 17, at 2 (“[S]elf-disablement is a critical aspect of any
precommitment strategy.”).
125. Id. at 4 (noting the benefits of self-imposed ignorance).
126. 1 HOMER, supra note 16, at 445, 447. The device permitted Ulysses to have his cake
and eat it too: “Ulysses clogged the ears of his crew with wax so they would not respond to
songs of the deadly Sirens, but ordered himself bound to the mast so he could enjoy them
without physical power to stray from his predetermined course.” Adam M. Samaha, Dead
Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 606, 655–56 (2008).
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Sirens’ direction.
Option-reducing devices are valuable precisely because a decision
maker or some other entity can design them to respond to specific
temptations.127 Option-reducing devices can exclude numerous
options or just a few, and they can exclude options irrevocably or
conditionally. They can extinguish options through technology (such
as a self-shutting engine) or they can delegate the option to some third
party who is less likely to fall prey to temptation (such as having an
employer pay a portion of his employee’s taxes).128
The line between an option-reducing device and a targeted
enforcement device is admittedly hazy, particularly since many
option-reducing devices do not completely eliminate options, but
instead make them extremely costly or difficult to achieve. Still, one
can grasp the conceptual difference between a speed bump and the act
of tying oneself to a ship’s mast. The former makes speeding more
uncomfortable; the latter all but eliminates the possibility of steering
one’s ship in a particular direction.
Both types of precommitment devices appear frequently
throughout public and private life.129 The U.S. Constitution has been
described as a precommitment device, as has the standard corporate
charter, the Social Security payroll tax, and the Christmas savings
club.130 All of these mechanisms reduce or vastly circumscribe certain
options in advance of a foreseen event. Some precommitment devices
are difficult to undo (such as bariatric surgery) and some are
relatively weak (such as annual gym memberships).131
Although the precommitment device presumes a level of “self”
commitment, the concept has been slowly expanded to include
devices that entities and government agencies impose on others. The
least objectionable device is one that an individual imposes on
himself with the stated intention of helping only himself.132
127. Bainbridge, supra note 17, at 2 (providing examples).
128. Lederman, supra note 113, at 697−98, 723−25 (discussing compliance benefits of tax
withholding).
129. For illustrative examples, see Daniel Akst, Commit Yourself, REASON.COM (May
2011), http://reason.com/archives/2011/04/18/commit-yourself.
130. See Susannah Camic, Earmarking: The Potential Benefits, 4 PITTSBURGH TAX REV.
55, 64 (2006) (Social Security and Medicare); Michael C. Dorf, The Aspirational Constitution,
77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1631, 1637–44 (2009) (the Constitution and Bill of Rights); Samuel
Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing Through Intermediaries, 85 VA. L. REV. 1627, 1640
(1999) (corporate charters); Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological
Evidence and Economic Theory, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1307–08 (1991) (Christmas clubs).
131. Memberships are a weak device because members can still decide to stay home,
despite paying money in advance for gym classes. See Stefano DellaVigna & Ulrike
Malmendier, Paying Not to Go to the Gym, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 694, 695 (2006) (theorizing
that consumers overestimate their future self-control in pursuing costly activities).
132. McAdams explicitly refers to self-commitment devices. McAdams, Signaling, supra
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One can also adopt a precommitment device with the express
intention of benefitting others. Professor Bainbridge refers to these as
“other-regarding” devices.133 If a housing contractor agrees that he
will reduce his overall fee if he completes the job after a certain date,
he has effectively committed himself to finishing the job on or before
that date.134 Precommitments like these are unsurprisingly common
throughout contract, commercial, and corporate law.135 If a corporate
officer binds himself in advance to provide shareholders with
quarterly and annual reports about the company’s performance, his
commitment intentionally aids others and presumably redounds to his
long-term benefit as well.136
Many of the legal regulations that scholars praise as “structural”
also function in the same way as precommitment devices.137
“Structure” eliminates the option to defect or engage in socially costly
behavior down the road.138 As Professor Edward Cheng explains,
structure prevails by “subtly shaping the physical, social, or other
arrangements that enable the behavior to occur in the first place.”139
The difference between the traditional precommitment device and
structural regulation, however, is that in the latter case, a government
agency designs and implements the structure (albeit in some instances
with the public’s backing).140 When government agents are the
note 18, at 656−58. Bainbridge refers to them as “self-regarding precommitments.” Bainbridge,
supra note 17, at 5.
133. Bainbridge, supra note 17, at 5−6.
134. The contractor may also place such a term in the contract to signal that he takes
deadlines seriously.
135. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 17, at 2–3, 22–25 (offering examples in corporate
and commercial law).
136. Professor Coffee explains that securities disclosure and the decision to place one’s
corporation on a public exchange acts as a “bonding” device. John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the
Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 229, 285 (2007) (citing John C.
Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate
Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 691–92 (1999)) (“[M]anagers bond[]
themselves not to accumulate excessive private benefits by deliberately subjecting themselves
to a stricter regulatory regime . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). As this Article’s
analysis demonstrates, the temporal inconsistency literature adds an additional gloss: the
federal securities laws’ disclosure requirements not only “bond” the agent to his principal, but
also precommit the corporate agent to a desirable course of conduct.
137. “Unlike fiat, structure does not regulate undesired behavior directly through ex post
penalties. Rather, it regulates indirectly and ex ante by subtly shaping the physical, social, or
other arrangements that enable the behavior to occur in the first place. Its philosophy is more
preventive than reactive.” Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating
Behavior, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 655, 662 (2006); see also Lederman, supra note 113, at 696.
138. Cheng, supra note 137, at 662.
139. Id. at 655, 662; see also Lederman, supra note 113, at 697.
140. “[A] lawmaker can provide cost-effective deterrence by mimicking the commitment
devices that sophisticated offenders would adopt for themselves.” Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals,
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authors of precommitment devices, new concerns arise.
For libertarians, the difference between the self-imposed or
government-imposed device is of tremendous significance, since
government incursions on decision-making implicate, as Professor
Michael Rich observes, “concerns about autonomy, privacy, and
bodily integrity.”141 For technocrats interested in improving social
welfare, the device’s success and net cost are of more interest,
although it seems likely that precommitment’s success depends in part
on its source.142
The libertarian critique that government ought not intervene to
protect the “long-term” self’s interest weakens considerably when one
narrows the focus to corporate fraud. The corporate enforcer’s task is
not to reduce all temporally inconsistent behavior, but rather that type
of behavior that society has already declared undesirable through
democratically enacted statutes and regulations.143 To the extent that
an individual’s short-term self (who prefers to lie and steal) is at war
with her long-term self (who prefers to abide by the law), there is no
contest. The short-term self is clearly out of order; society has already
made that clear.144 At that point, the state has every reason to get
involved.
II. HOW OPPORTUNISM AND TEMPORAL INCONSISTENCY INTERACT
Some people are more inclined to take advantage of others through
supra note 18, at 677. “Although one usually thinks about precommitment from an
individualist perspective, the term is also usefully applied to group, societal, or national
decisions.” Robertson, supra note 16, at 1732.
141. Michael L. Rich, Should We Make Crime Impossible?, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
795, 802 (2013) (discussing the philosophical importance of government involvement in
structural criminal regulation); accord Cheng, supra note 137, at 669 (“The involuntary nature
of structural regulation raises objections of excessive government control, reduced liberty, and
invasions of privacy.”).
142. Compare Michael Abramowicz & Ian Ayres, Commitment Bonds, 100 GEO. L.J. 605
(2012) (exploring the economic uses of government and privately issued commitment bonds),
with Rich, supra note 141, at 800–01 (citing specific concerns with government-imposed
structural regulations).
143. Concededly, neither courts nor legislatures have defined terms like “fraud” with
adequate precision. See generally Buell, supra note 34.
144. However, society may not desire the government to punish all conduct that is
described as criminal. See, e.g., Rich, supra note 141, at 810 (noting that societal perspectives
on crime detection and punishment vary depending on the crime at issue); Josh Bowers, Legal
Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV.
1655, 1658–59 (2010) (“Most people anticipate something approximating categorical
enforcement of very serious felonies but anticipate nonenforcement of some nontrivial number
of petty crime incidents.” (footnote omitted)). Accordingly, the presence of precommitment
devices places on the legislature greater pressure to clarify ex ante which behavior is legally
acceptable.
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deceptive and illegal means, and some are more likely to fall prey to
their short-term desires. How might the combination of these
dispositions within a single person—much less a single
organization—affect the likelihood of corporate fraud?
This Part explores the above question by examining the interaction
between opportunism and temporal inconsistency. Section A briefly
reviews the characteristics that render corporations prone to
opportunistic and temporally inconsistent misconduct. Section B then
models their interaction, generating a typology of corporate
employees who present differing degrees of risk (and value) to the
corporation.
A. The Corporate Firm as a Locus of Misconduct
Opportunism and temporal inconsistency thrive under similar
conditions. They are particularly likely to arise in organizations that:
(1) grant officers and employees wide discretion, (2) shield decision
makers’ processes from external review, and (3) embrace objectives
that are complex enough to divide costs and benefits into different
time periods. Individually and taken as a whole, these conditions
increase the likelihood of both opportunistic and temporally
inconsistent behavior. Not surprisingly, these conditions are prevalent
within corporations.
Corporate firms vest a number of their employees with increasing
levels of discretion. Discretion can be quite valuable to the firm as it
enables innovation and quick thinking.145 It may also attract more
intelligent, devoted employees.146 Nevertheless, discretion has its
drawbacks. It enables an agent to ignore her principal’s interests and
instead serve her own.147 Moreover, with discretion comes temptation
and a surfeit of options, all of which enable the decision maker to
eschew her long-term interests for short-term pleasures.148
By the same token, both sets of problems arise when organizations
are opaque.149 Within large and even mid-size corporations,
145. See Nils Stieglitz & Klaus Heine, Innovations and the Role of Complementarities in a
Strategic Theory of the Firm, 28 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1, 7–8 (2007).
146. Catherine E. Ross & Barbara F. Reskin, Education, Control at Work, and Job
Satisfaction, 21 SOC. SCI. RES. 134, 139 (1992) (finding that “education is linked to
significantly less routine work, [and] significantly more job autonomy”).
147. Thomas L. Carson, Self-Interest and Business Ethics: Some Lessons of the Recent
Corporate Scandals, 43 J. BUS. ETHICS 389, 391 (2003) (“In the case of high-ranking business
executives, discretion to do good is also discretion to do bad.”).
148. Id.
149. “Private organizations are relatively opaque, the more so the larger and more
sophisticated they are. Layers of hierarchy must be penetrated to reach principal actors.
Division of labor makes ascription of responsibility for conduct and results challenging.” Buell,
supra note 70, at 1625.
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responsibility and accountability fragment among and between
different groups and hierarchies.150 Agents can more easily deceive
principals, and temporally inconsistent individuals are more likely to
yield to temptation. When no one else is looking, one can more easily
steal from the petty cash account, cook the books, or eat the cookie on
someone else’s desk.
Finally, both sets of problems arise when decision makers reside in
a world in which benefits and costs emerge over different time
periods. The child who refuses to eat his broccoli at supper learns
quite quickly that he will suffer immediate costs in the form of
foregone dessert and reduced access to television. Organizational
decision-making, by contrast, inherently plays out over multiple time
periods, thereby weakening the feedback loop the corporate officer
experiences in response to his wrongful behavior.151
Within the corporate firm, the decision an employee makes today
(good or bad) may not produce consequences for months or even
years. Similarly, fraud and corruption rarely trigger immediate
sanctions, in part because they occur in the context of projects that
unspool over a period of months or years. As Professor Utset himself
points out, criminal conduct often involves “a series of intertemporal
decisions. An offender must plan and execute the crime, and will have
to take steps to avoid detection after the fact.”152 Accordingly,
benefits and costs are almost always skewed across different time
periods. Successive time periods create problems for the rational and
hyperbolic alike: they enable corporate agents the time and
opportunity necessary to deceive unknowing principals, and they
tempt short-term selves sufficiently to disrupt and disable long-term
plans.
B. Theorizing the Interaction
Imagine a world in which individuals occupy different points on
two spectra. We might depict these two spectra as follows:

150. See, e.g., ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS
17–18 (1988) (describing both the centralization and decentralization of authority and
responsibility within corporations); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within
a Theory of the Firm, 21 J. CORP. L. 657, 669–71 (1996) (describing “branching hierarchies”
within large public organizations that divide, specialize, and delegate authority and
responsibility).
151. See Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight into
Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 133, 176–79 (2000) (discussing intertemporal
“time-delay traps” that arise within corporations); cf. Buell, supra note 70, at 1627 (referring to
the “slow ripening” of criminal liability within corporate firms).
152. Manuel A. Utset, Inchoate Crimes Revisited: A Behavioral Economic Perspective, 47
U. RICH. L. REV. 1205, 1206 (2013).
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Figure 1: Two Spectra
Consistency
Temporally consistent

Hyperbolic

Motivations
Faithful

Opportunistic

The bottom line, which we might label the “motivational
spectrum,” measures an individual’s intentions. For purposes of
simplicity, this Article assumes these intentions are “net” intentions,
in light of any applicable rules, social norms, or cognitive biases.
When all is said and done, some individuals are more motivated than
others to do harm and some are more motivated than others to do
good. This indeed remains one of the key challenges for any corporate
enforcer: within the corporation, despite efforts designed to assure the
contrary, some agents seek to do great deeds, whereas others
affirmatively desire harm.
To the extent an agent falls on the faithful, “good” end of the
spectrum, her devotion to her principal may arise because she is
inherently well-motived, because she happens to employ a relatively
low discount rate, or because her interests are well-aligned by preexisting legal, economic, and social institutions.153 Regardless, our
well-motivated agent seeks to achieve the short- and long-term goals
that she believes her principal desires. Although she may harm her
principal through mistake or accident, the costs of her mistakes are
relatively low compared to those costs that arise from intentional
misconduct. As a result, society can rely primarily on markets and
contractual protections to address these basic competence issues.
At the other end of this motivational spectrum is the pure
opportunist. Unlike the well-motivated agent, the opportunist seeks
solely to benefit himself, often at the expense of his principal. For
purposes of this analysis, it is irrelevant whether the opportunist takes
perverse pleasure in denying his principal’s wishes, or simply exploits
weaknesses in institutions. Under either scenario, the opportunist
knowingly engages in a course of conduct that harms his principal.
153. Accordingly, this Article assumes that an individual’s “net motivation” takes into
account various factors such as organization’s culture and its enforcement regime’s perceived
legitimacy among its employees. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Legitimacy and Criminal Justice:
The Benefits of Self-Regulation, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 307, 319–20 (2009) (summarizing the
procedural justice model for securing individuals’ voluntary compliance with the law).
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More importantly, because our opportunist knows he is acting in
contravention of his principal’s wishes, he undertakes a number of
measures to obscure the nature of his actions. It is this effort to cover
one’s tracks that evokes Oliver Williamson’s famous definition of
opportunism: self-interest seeking with guile.154
Presumably, most individuals fall somewhere on the middle of this
motivational spectrum and move around depending on the legal and
social institutions involved. Much of the deterrence and agency-cost
literature represents an attempt to devise and identify those
mechanisms that most effectively move individuals from the “bad”
(undesirable) end of the spectrum to good side, and to expel from
business organizations (and society itself) those individuals who
remain at the opportunistic end, despite all these efforts.
The other spectrum in Figure 1 reflects an individual’s temporal
consistency. Individuals who harbor different motivations also harbor
different perceptions of costs and benefits as time unfolds. At the far
end of this spectrum are those who consistently and pathologically
favor long-term payoffs.155 These individuals are hyperopic in that
they pathologically avoid immediate gratification.156 Although
hyperopia may well impose costs on society, fraud is not likely to be
among them. People who pathologically worry about the long-term
(which ought to include fines and prison sentences) are not likely to
engage in serious illegal conduct.
The more important group, located in the middle of the spectrum,
is the one that either “naturally” maintains stable preferences or has
external methods to create this type of stability.157 Even among this
group, we may find individuals who maintain consistently high
discount rates and therefore seek immediate gratification.158 In the
corporate context, however, this is unlikely, as most corporate
employees have attained significant levels of education and
employment success. One cannot achieve these mileposts while also
154. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. Professor Buell argues that consciousness
of wrongdoing—often demonstrated by efforts to cover one’s tracks—is often the means by
which judges decide whether an instance of misconduct qualifies as criminal “fraud.” Samuel
W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1982–83 (2006).
155. Professor Fennell discusses hyperopia and its tendency to produce people who
excessively save. Fennell, Willpower Taxes, supra note 12, at 1375–76.
156. Id.
157. “[I]f there is perfect foresight and perfect means for self-commitment, then a person
with a present-bias is just like someone with no bias.” McAdams, Signaling, supra note 18, at
658.
158. As noted earlier, the individual with the consistently high discount rate does not lack
willpower so much as she lacks interest in her future. Fennell, Willpower Taxes, supra note 12,
at 1416 (explaining that “the question of willpower . . . assumes knowledge of a better longterm plan than the current self wishes to undertake”).
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maintaining pathologically high discount rates.159
Finally, at the inconsistent end of the spectrum are those who lack
willpower or who hyperbolically discount time. This is the group that
scholars such as Professor Utset have done such a nice job of
highlighting.160 These are the individuals who routinely fall prey to
their short-term interests, or react too strongly to their emotions and
make “hot” decisions that conflict with longer-term “cold”
determinations.161 This, in turn, is the group that is said to “lack
willpower.”162
At this point, one might wonder if a relationship exists between
motivations and temporal consistency. Psychologists have found
some correlation between altruism and willpower,163 but the finding
prompts additional questions: Is there something about being faithful
or faithless that causes a person to either ignore or swear off his timeinconsistent habits, or is this simply a correlation signifying the
importance of some other variable?164
For now, this Article assumes that the two traits are largely
independent of each other. One’s placement on one spectrum should
therefore tell us nothing about where one falls on the other spectrum.
This leaves us with a basic two-by-two matrix:

159. “Corporations are filled with highly educated individuals who have regularly delayed
gratification in some domains in order to achieve longer term gains.” Hollander-Blumoff, supra
note 18, at 548; see also Sally S. Simpson & Nicole Leeper Piquero, Low Self-Control,
Organizational Theory, and Corporate Crime, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 509, 533 (2002) (finding
that “key tenets of low self-control theory” were unsupported by survey experiment testing
attitudes towards corporate crime). Of course, the fact that corporate and white-collar criminals
exhibit control in some contexts does not mean that they are able to control themselves in
others.
160. E.g., Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals, supra note 18.
161. E.g., id.
162. As Fennell points out, the hyperopic individual also could lack willpower, insofar as
she desires—but is otherwise unable—to overcome her tendency to overweigh longer term
benefits and costs. Fennell, Willpower Taxes, supra note 12, at 1375.
163. BAUMEISTER & TIERNEY, supra note 91, at 260.
164. See, e.g., Robert H. Frank, The Role of Moral Sentiments in the Theory of
Intertemporal Choice, in CHOICE OVER TIME, supra note 75, at 265, 266 (arguing that “moral
sentiments enable people to solve two types of time-inconsistency problems”).
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Figure 2: Matrix

Assuming everyone carries equal power and responsibility within
the organization, we can generate four categories of individuals. We
might array those categories, from “most valuable” to “most
harmful,” as follows:
Figure 2a: A Typology of Employees
1. well motivated, consistent
2. well motivated, inconsistent
3. opportunistic, inconsistent
4. opportunistic, consistent
At the top of the heap are those agents who are both wellmotivated and able to adhere to their long-term plans. Some
individuals come by their self-control naturally. Others may foresee
their tendency to switch preferences and therefore bind themselves in
advance to their long-term commitments.165 Whether one’s selfgenerated consistency is “natural” or “imposed” is irrelevant for now.
Next, we consider the well-motivated but inconsistent person.166
This individual is the poster child for the unfulfilled promise. She
165. McAdams, Signaling, supra note 18, at 659.
166. McAdams similarly distinguishes between consistent “good” types and inconsistent
“good” types, albeit for different purposes. Id. at 658 (discussing ways in which “imperfect
self-commitment” increases the difficulty of distinguishing between cooperative and
uncooperative partners in prisoner’s dilemma games).
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intends (at least initially) to provide value to her principal but she
fails to carry out her long-term plans. Instead, she procrastinates and
either prematurely or excessively consumes, often to her regret.
All (rational) organizations should prefer category one to category
two. This is not to say the inconsistent agent is useless. Some work is
cheap and yields quick benefits up front. A well-motivated hyperbolic
discounter will experience no problem completing easy projects, some
of which may be quite valuable to the firm. Moreover, the
inconsistent agent can become more effecrive if others within the
organization devise effective precommitment devices to keep her on
track.
On the other side of the ledger are those who harbor harmful
intentions toward their principal. These individuals presumably do
some good work for their organization, if only to escape immediate
termination from their jobs. Nevertheless, on net, these are the
individuals who either harm or impose a risk of harm on their
respective organizations.
Admittedly, motivations are not fixed; they may evolve over time
or change in response to new circumstances.167 An individual’s
supervisor might threaten to fire an undisclosed number of employees
in her group; her company might otherwise treat her in a way she
deems unjustified and undeserved. For any number of reasons, the
well- motivated employee can become the opportunistic one.
Moreover, temporal inconsistency may play a role in how motivations
change.
One might conclude from the foregoing analysis that corporations
should shy away from anyone who appears to be temporally
inconsistent. Unfortunately, that would leave most corporations bereft
of many of their employees, and unreasonably so, given the fact that
many corporate employees ultimately comply with the law.168
Finally, one reaches the worst group in the typology, the consistent
opportunist. Readers may disagree as to who poses more danger: the
consistent or hyperbolic opportunist. The consistent opportunist, who
knows that she harbors bad intentions, may ironically plan out a series
of “good acts” to cover her fraud. Moreover, she will respond to the
threat of sanctions (if they are large and credible enough) because she
167. Indeed, if motivations exist separately from temporal inconsistency, then the
consistent, well-motivated person could also morph into a consistent opportunist.
168. “Although newspaper headlines remind us that serious instances of noncompliance
constantly recur, it nevertheless appears that (at least in most economically advanced
democracies) most business firms, particularly large ones, substantially comply with most
kinds of regulations most of the time.” Robert A. Kagan et al., Fear, Duty, and Regulatory
Compliance: Lessons from Three Research Projects, in EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE 37, 40
(Christine Parker & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen eds., 2011).
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is rational.169 Nevertheless, assuming she is undeterred by existing
laws, she poses the most danger to her corporation. She has the
ability (and inclination) to carry out harmful long-term projects.
Indeed, to the extent “harm” combines up-front personal costs with
long-term personal benefits, consistent opportunists are dangerous
precisely because they possess both the mettle and foresight to bind
themselves to their opportunistic plans.
Hyperbolic opportunists, by contrast, pose more of a conundrum.
They may harbor desires averse to those of their principal, but they
are not likely to engage in the type of harm that requires a substantial
amount of up-front work.170 (Then again, they are not likely to
complete any helpful projects that require up-front work either).
Accordingly, hyperbolic opportunists are not a threat insofar as harm
requires up-front work, but they still can do a fair amount of damage
when they can impose harm easily and with little up-front effort.
Given the foregoing, an enforcer who has “maxed out” sanctions
and detection efforts ought to prefer the hyperbolic opportunist to the
consistent one. Both harbor negative motivations, but only the
consistent one will expend the energy to engage in harmful long-term
projects.
Moreover, hyperbolic opportunists are more easily
identified. Consistent opportunists invest more heavily in expensive
detection avoidance measures, since avoidance itself requires some
degree of up-front planning. Hyperbolic opportunists, because they
lack consistency, are less likely to follow through with sophisticated
efforts at avoiding detection.
Thus, the analysis of the two dimensions provides a more nuanced
portrayal of who is most likely to complete work that is desirable to
the principal (“good”), and who is most likely to engage in conduct
that is undesirable to the principal (“bad”):

169. Government officials appear to recognize this point: “Someone who violates the law
ruthlessly and rationally is more amenable to deterrence than someone who acts impulsively or
someone who gives in to enormous pressure.” David M. Becker, What More Can Be Done to
Deter Violations of the Federal Securities Laws?, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1849, 1851 (2012) (offering
observations, as former SEC General Counsel, on how the SEC might improve enforcement).
170. See Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals, supra note 18, at 665–67 (labeling the phenomenon
“time inconsistent obedience”).
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Figure 3: Tendencies Towards Good and Bad Acts
Consistent,
WellMotivated

Inconsistent,
Well-Motivated

Inconsistent,
Opportunistic

Consistent,
Opportunistic

Costly,171
Good
Acts
Cheap,
Good
Acts
Cheap,
Bad Acts
Costly,
Bad Acts

The depiction in Figure 3 is not an exact representation of
behavior. Even the consistent, opportunistic employee will perform
some good activities for his organization. Accordingly, we could
easily place an “x” in all of the boxes for “cheap, good acts” and we
might also find that even the consistent opportunist engages in some
“costly, good acts.”172 The above table depicts the individual’s
tendency to perform such acts, as compared with everyone else. Thus,
the individual who is both consistent and opportunistic poses the
greatest threat of engaging in costly, bad acts. By the same token, the
consistent, well-motivated employee is best poised to perform
valuable, but initially costly, good acts.
Professor Utset has praised temporal inconsistency as desirable
insofar as it reduces an opportunistic agent’s resolve to engage in
wrongdoing.173 As Figure 3 demonstrates, the story is a bit more
nuanced. Opportunistic, temporally inconsistent individuals may be
less likely to carry out difficult and long-term negative projects, but
they will have no problem engaging in misconduct that requires little
effort.
The broader rule of thumb that one can derive from Figure 3 is that
temporal inconsistency reduces the variance between faithful and
opportunistic employees. Good agents are not as good as they intend
to be, and bad agents are not as bad as they desire to be. Accordingly,
171. By “costly,” I mean personally costly to the agent in the first or immediate period,
and by “cheap,” I mean personally cheap to the agent in the first or immediate period.
172. Notice, the conduct is not symmetrical. Whereas all employees will perform some
“good” acts to keep their jobs, not all employees will perform “bad” acts.
173. Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals, supra note 18, at 644–45.
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when temporal inconsistency is evenly distributed throughout the
corporate employee and officer population, it reduces the costs of
erroneously identifying a given agent as faithful or opportunistic.
Additional complications ensue when one considers the fluidity of
the two dispositions. Motivations change depending on context and
personal tastes. The same is true for temporal inconsistency. Some
people always procrastinate, but others move back and forth along the
continuum. Finally, it may be the case that one disposition reduces or
exacerbates the other. Perhaps hyperbolic discounting acts as a
“gateway” to future opportunistic behavior. (“I already blew the
deadline, so maybe I should also lie to my boss.”) Or, perhaps an
opportunistic disposition forces a level of discipline on an individual
who otherwise would have lacked sufficient willpower. (“Now that I
have lied to my shareholders, I better take extra care to check my
regional profit reports every day.”).
A final caveat: The above typology assumes that all individuals
hold the same position within the firm. In fact, we know that most
organizations employ many levels of formal or informal hierarchy.174
Once we relax the assumption of equal responsibility, the possible
combinations of temporal inconsistency and opportunism expand
considerably. Even a two-tier hierarchical scheme is more difficult to
gauge, as a supervisor may fit any of the four categories, and her
employee may also fall within any of those four categories.
III. THE CORPORATE ENFORCER’S TOOLBOX: POLICING AND
ARCHITECTURE
Part II’s depiction of the interaction between opportunism and
temporal inconsistency provides a useful typology for corporate
enforcers. Some individuals are opportunistic and consistent (and
presumably very dangerous) whereas others are well-motivated but
highly temporally inconsistent, and so on. As one abandons the
assumption that all employees hold equal responsibility and power,
one recognizes that opportunism and temporal inconsistency play a
rich and complex role in generating and masking corporate fraud.
With this complexity in mind, Part III identifies three strategies
corporate enforcers might employ to reduce fraud. The three
strategies, in turn, form the building blocks of two broader
enforcement approaches. A policing approach attempts to reduce
fraud by identifying and sanctioning risky people. An architectural
174. Rubin, supra note 25, at 352 (observing that “most large firms continue to be
organized along hierarchical lines”). But see Érica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Knowledge
Inputs, Legal Institutions and Firm Structure: Towards a Knowledge-Based Theory of the
Firm, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1123, 1131–32 (2007) (observing that high-tech firms eschew
hierarchy).
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approach focuses on identifying and changing risky structures, in part
through the encouragement and promulgation of precommitment
devices.175
As this Article explains, the two approaches draw upon some of
the same tools and can behave as substitutes or complements. There
may be times when policing performs better than architecture (or vice
versa), but there also may be times when policing benefits from
architecture (and vice versa). In a world where corporate employees
and officers are, by varying degrees, opportunistic and temporally
inconsistent, both approaches are necessary.
A. Three Strategies
Imagine a corporate enforcer who has been tasked with reducing
wrongdoing within her organization. She encounters individuals who
fall anywhere on both the “consistency” and “motivational” spectra
described in Part II. She also confronts a fair amount of wrongdoing
that has been caused by varying amounts of opportunism and
temporal inconsistency. How should she respond?
Broadly speaking, the hypothetical enforcer176 can choose among
three options. She can screen out potential wrongdoers, either by
refusing to hire such employees or demanding their termination. She
also can transform the corporation’s employees, either through some
combination of external incentives (sanctions and surveillance) or
internal motivations (culture and norms-based education).177 Finally,
she can restructure those situations that make opportunism and
temporal inconsistency more likely and more dangerous to the
175. To some degree, the two approaches reflect the opposing regulatory styles described
by Professor Robert Kagan:
At one pole, aggressive regulatory offices or officials are called “legalistic”, or
“sanction”-oriented, devotees of a “deterrence” model or “coercive” style of
regulation. Toward the other pole, they are labeled “conciliatory” or
“accommodative”, as more interested in “compliance” than in deterrence, as
oriented toward seeking results through “cooperation” rather than by coercion,
as “consultants” rather than “cops.”
Robert A. Kagan, Understanding Regulatory Enforcement, 11 LAW & POL’Y 89, 92 (1989).
176. For the sake of simplicity, this Article imagines a single individual who has the sole
responsibility for these functions. In reality, of course, multiple individuals may take on the
roles and strategies described within this section.
177. Yuval Feldman describes these two approaches as “extrinsic” and “intrinsic”
motivations for compliance. The extrinsic motivation arises from fear of sanctions and
detection, whereas intrinsic motivations arise “out of a sense of moral or civic duty.” Yuval
Feldman, The Complexity of Disentangling Intrinsic and Extrinsic Compliance Motivations:
Theoretical and Empirical Insights from the Behavioral Analysis of Law, 35 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL’Y 11, 12 (2011).
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corporation. Assuming the enforcer is herself well-motivated and
consistent (admittedly a large assumption), which strategies should
she choose?
1. Screening
A screening strategy requires the enforcer to identify and exclude
(or expel, if the employee already works for the corporation)
employees who are either consistent or hyperbolic opportunists. She
might also wish to screen out well-motivated but temporally
inconsistent indivdiuals, since their motivations too may become
negative. But at some point, this will leave the corporation with too
small an employee pool.178 Accordingly, we can assume that she will
focus primarily on identifying and excluding opportunists.
In theory, screening is a sound strategy. Opportunists favor
themselves at everyone else’s expense, and temporally inconsistent
individuals are either ineffective (since they cannot accomplish
desirable goals) or enablers of their more opportunistic colleagues.
Accordingly, all things being equal, the enforcer would prefer either
to screen out these individuals, or at least fire them before they cause
serious problems.
Aside from legal limitations that reduce the corporation’s
flexibility in hiring or firing, screening’s key drawback is that it is
prone to error.179 Opportunists are, by definition, deceptive. As for
temporal inconsistency, screeners may encounter difficulty isolating
“ordinary” temporal inconsistency from the type of willpower
deficiencies most likely to enable or produce wrongdoing.180 Many
people over-eat or fail to complete projects until the last minute, but
that does not tell us who will produce fraudulent financial statements
or offer illegal bribes to foreign officials.181
Where does this leave our enforcer? Certainly she can perform
criminal history and background checks. And she can watch for
employees who blatantly transgress rules or repeatedly fail to meet
internal deadlines or file necessary reports. But beyond these obvious
178. See supra p. 36.
179. Susan J. Stabile, The Use of Personality Tests as a Hiring Tool: Is the Benefit Worth
the Cost?, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 279, 290 (2002).
180. “Firms may try to screen out employees with impulse control problems, but none of
the usual methods (psychological tests, interviewing, and checking references) will be
completely reliable. Firms will therefore have a proportion of employees who will find the
short-term gains from shirking quite irresistible.” Daniel S. Nagin et al., Monitoring,
Motivation, and Management: The Determinants of Opportunistic Behavior in a Field
Experiment, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 850, 854 (2002).
181. Researchers have found that individuals can be patient in one context (studying hard
for exams) and prone to short-term gratification in others. See Preface to CHOICE OVER TIME,
supra note 75, at xvii–xviii (citing studies showing that discounts can vary for a single person).
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red flags, she will have little to guide her. “Screening” might, at its
worst, become an excuse for discriminatory employment practices.182
One can imagine a number of compliance officers either adopting
some terrible proxies (assuming that an overweight individual will
commit fraud, for example) or administering crude psychology
tests.183
Apart from error costs, screeners must also contend with
unintended consequences. For example, if a corporate department
initially employs ten opportunists and the enforcer’s efforts reduce
that number to two, then the magnitude and frequency of wrongdoing
within that department may not in fact decline. For example, if the
eight opportunists screened out by the enforcer were low-hanging
fruit, she unintentionally does the remaining two opportunists a favor.
Freed from competing with eight potential rivals, the remaining two
may either fill the vacuum left by the eight, or in fact do more harm,
now that they no longer have to worry about their rivals.184
Screening thus suffers the same drawbacks as most preventative
strategies. The enforcer who relies on this strategy may exclude (or
fire) too many employees or she may exclude (or fire) too few. She
may identify the wrong individuals as opportunists or she may find
that firing one opportunist perversely increases the effectiveness of
the remaining opportunists within the organization. For all these
reasons and more, our enforcer will need to rely on additional tools.
2. Transforming
In addition to screening, the enforcer might also attempt to
transform the employee population, moving them from one side of
either spectra to the other.
With regard to the first disposition, the enforcer can alter a
corporate employee’s motivation externally by imposing sanctions for
noncompliance or by informing employees of the sanctions that
external enforcers might impose in response to noncompliance.185 For
these sanctions to be credible, however, the enforcer must also engage
in some level of monitoring.186 When the threat of sanctions

182. Stabile, supra note 179, at 303–08.
183. For a critique of corporate personality tests, see generally Stabile, supra note 179.
184. Cf. Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence’s Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2428 (1997)
(presenting a similar situation involving drug rings).
185. See Christine Parker, The Ethics of Advising on Regulatory Compliance: Autonomy
or Independence, 28 J. BUS. ETHICS 339, 345 (2000) (reporting on conversations with
compliance officers who have persuaded employees to change behavior by demonstrating
external costs of noncompliance).
186. For a discussion of deterrence theory, see supra Section I.B.
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increases, the net benefits of opportunistic behavior decreases.187 This
is the common, “deterrence-based” approach to entity-level corporate
compliance.188 Applied too aggressively, the deterrence-oriented
compliance program can backfire by causing mid- and lower-level
employees to harbor increasing amounts of distrust and resentment
within the organization.189 Applied too weakly, it can devolve into a
means for corporations to “purchase” just enough protection from
entity-level criminal liability while otherwise ignoring (or subtly
encouraging) widespread illegal behavior.190
Alternately, the corporate enforcer may attempt to alter
motivations internally through some type of cultural education191 and
norms generation.192 Because internalized norms impose an
immediate conscience-created cost at the moment of bad behavior,
they may reduce willpower failures. Moreover, they may also increase
internal whistle-blowing and the likelihood of detection for pure
opportunists.193 Corporate cultural efforts thus communicate to
employees both the corporation’s background rules and ethical
expectations. Cultural compliance efforts tend to remind employees
that compliance is “everyone’s concern” and that all employees have
187. As Professor First has noted:
A key insight of economics is that actors, whether individuals or
organizations, will respond to incentives. To the extent that there are
incentives to cooperate with government investigators in business crime cases,
those making decisions for the organization will cooperate, even if it means
that some constituents (employees or, perhaps, current shareholders) suffer.
First, supra note 64, at 60.
188. An important caveat here is that the corporation must receive leniency for catching
and reporting wrongdoing, otherwise it will have no incentive to implement its compliance
program. See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 71, at 690–91; Arlen, supra note 6, at 837.
189. Cf. Tyler, supra note 153, at 310 (criticizing the deterrence approach as fostering an
antagonistic relationship between society and the police); see also IAN AYRES & JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 20 (Donald R. Harris et al. eds., 1992) (making a
similar argument in the corporate context and observing that “[a] strategy based mostly on
punishment fosters an organized business subculture of resistance to regulation”).
190. See William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of
Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1348 n.15 (1999) (cautioning that corporations may view
corporate compliance as a form of “risk management”).
191. See Paternoster & Simpson, supra note 117, at 571 (finding that “reported intentions
to commit corporate crime were significantly lower for those who thought the act was contrary
to their personal moral code”).
192. See Scott Killingsworth, Modeling the Message: Communicating Compliance
Through Organizational Values and Culture, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 961, 961 (2012)
(describing how communication of norms and values can increase compliance and reporting).
193. For the value of norms in securing compliance, see Richard H. McAdams, The
Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 386 (1997) and Cass R.
Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2030 (1996).
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a responsibility to adhere to the law and ensure that others are doing
so.194
Despite their intuitive appeal, strategies that attempt to alter
internal motivations have their own drawbacks. Norms are difficult to
develop and measure, and opportunists should be best able to fake the
presence of good ethics.195 Scholars have long worried that
corporations can enact “cosmetic” compliance measures that
insincerely promote ethical behavior while they quietly encourage the
opposite.196
Finally, the external and internal approaches can be self-defeating,
working against each other and undermining compliance overall.
Strong sanction and monitoring regimes pit the employee in an
adversarial relationship with the corporation, thereby undermining the
softer, pro-social arguments for helping the company by following the
law.197 If the corporation is not careful, its external efforts (threats of
sanctions or monitoring) may crowd out internal motivations, creating
a dangerous vacuum in which opportunistic employees who are savvy
enough to avoid the corporation’s internal policing apparatus remain
unchecked by fellow employees who have become resentful of the
organization.198
3. Structuring
The third strategy relies on a form of structuring and builds on an
approach that Professors Cheng and Lederman have separately
embraced in other contexts.199 Under this approach, the Enforcer
194. “[C]ompliance professions continually attempt to ‘cascade’ responsibility for
compliance down through line management, so that a culture of compliance commitment
permeates the organization . . . .” Parker, supra note 185, at 346.
195. See Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, with
Special Reference to Sanctions, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 369, 369 (1999) (arguing there is
difficulty in government actions designed to “promote desirable norms or repress undesirable
ones”); Steven Shavell, Law Versus Morality as Regulators of Conduct, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
227, 254 (2002) (explaining the difficulty of inculcating overarching moral principles through
the law).
196. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated
Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 490–91 (2003); Laufer, supra note 190, at 1372 (citing
surveys indicating that some corporations aim solely for maintaining an appearance of
compliance rather than “a meaningful culture of ethical awareness and law abidance”).
197. See Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative
Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX.
L. REV. 1151, 1176 (2010) (discussing “crowding out” problems in compliance); see also
Milton C. Regan, Jr., Moral Intuitions and Organizational Culture, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 941,
971–73 (2007) (distinguishing deterrence-based compliance programs from “values-based”
programs, which focus on internal norms).
198. Feldman & Lobel, supra note 197, at 1155.
199. See supra Section I.D.
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performs a top-down analysis of the company, identifies those
situations that appear vulnerable to exploitation, and reduces those
vulnerabilities by changing the methods in which decisions are made
and implemented.200 Wrongdoing is prevented through institutional
design rather than through the threat of sanctions and policing.201
The structural approach requires corporate employees to identify
operational and compliance risk. At an abstract level, this is not
difficult to imagine. A decision-making structure in which one
individual enjoys unbridled discretion and oversight over the
disposition of large sums of money is one that increases opportunities
for embezzlement, fraud, and bribery. By the same token, a structure
that shields from internal oversight the collection and external
reporting of data increases the probability of financial reporting
fraud.202 In both of these situations, compelled and continuous
disclosure vastly reduces opportunities for opportunistic and
temporally inconsistent behavior.
Some structures may be as simple as multiple signatory
requirements (referred to as the “four eyes” principle) or limitations
on access to information (“Chinese walls”).203 Other structures may
involve automation or physical limitations that remove individual
judgment. A speed bump not only forces the driver to slow down, but
it also removes the traffic officer’s discretion to apprehend drivers
who exceed certain speeds. The “bump” takes care of the officer’s
job. By the same token, automation can also either reduce or replace
the manager’s discretion or impose the equivalent of a second set of
eyes.
More concretely, Professor David Zaring has reported on new
innovations that corporations have devised to reduce foreign bribery,
including the use of automation to reduce human interaction between
corporate employees and foreign government officials who might
200. See Cheng, supra note 137, at 662–66.
201. Id. at 662–63.
202. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Structural Holes, CEOs, and Informational Monopolies:
The Missing Link in Corporate Governance, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1353–54 (2005)
(discussing Worldcom). For the role that “informational holes” played in the corporate fraud
scandals of early 2000s, and an argument that legal reform should focus on “how the
relationship between internal corporate structures and board structures provide opportunities
for misconduct,” see id. at 1315; see also Nicola Faith Sharpe, Questioning Authority: The
Critical Link Between Board Power and Process, 38 J. CORP. L. 1, 5–6 (2012), for an argument
that board-level information failures promote misconduct.
203. See, e.g., James H. Freis, Jr., An Outsider’s Look into the Regulation of Insider
Trading in Germany: A Guide to Securities, Banking, and Market Reform in Finanzplatz
Deutschland, 19 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 98 n.551 (defining the “four eyes” principle);
H. Nejat Seyhun, Insider Trading and the Effectiveness of Chinese Walls in Securities Firms, 4
J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 369, 369 (2008) (defining Chinese walls).
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otherwise demand illegal payments in person.204 By removing human
judgment “at the source,” automated technologies eliminate the option
of bribing local officials in exchange for better or faster services. In
this sense, structure eliminates the possibility of wrongdoing.
Admittedly, not all structures function as precommitment devices,
and certainly, not all structures will be viewed as such. A hedge fund
that installs a Chinese wall between two operational units to prevent
insider trading may be “precommitting” itself by foreclosing
communication between those two groups. Indeed, some members of
those units may be thankful for the check on strong but passing
temptations to break the law. Nevertheless, depending on how the
corporation devises its internal rules, other employees may perceive
the Chinese wall as yet another level of bureaucratic regulation.
Even when self-imposed, not all structures are valuable devices.
Some structures may rely too heavily on automation; others may
operate too crudely and foreclose too many options; still others may
be merely cosmetic and foreclose too few options. Like screening and
transforming, the structural strategy is far from foolproof. Ulysses got
it right on the first try, but in the real world, it might take several
attempts to figure out how best to tie oneself (and others) to the mast.
B. Two Approaches
Section III.A identified three strategies that an enforcer might
choose to counteract fraud. The strategies, in turn, build up to two
very different enforcement philosophies and modes of behavior. The
first is a policing approach that mimics the response we have come to
expect from government agencies, whereby enforcers utilize
screening and incentive strategies to identify and punish wrongdoers.
These are the activities we commonly associate with the term
“corporate policing.” Professor Jennifer Arlen nicely describes the
approach as including: “(1) monitoring to detect wrongdoing; (2)
investigating suspicious activities; (3) reporting violations to federal
authorities; and (4) cooperating with [government] authorities to help
them identify and sanction the individuals responsible for the
violation.”205
Because it is intended to expand the government’s enforcement
reach, corporate policing looks and feels very much like its criminal
law counterpart, government policing. Internal enforcers are expected
to identify and deter potentially bad people through different
204. “Oil service firms and importers have, for example, tried to automate as much of the
customs process in Indonesia as possible, limiting the number of personal interactions between
firms and officials.” David Zaring, Private Sector Anti-Bribery Initiatives?, CONGLOMERATE
(Apr. 5, 2013), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2013/04/private-sector-anti-bribery-initiatives.html.
205. Arlen, supra note 72, at 332.
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combinations of surveillance, bounties, threats of sanctions, and
increasingly pervasive monitoring.206 Having identified the
corporation’s offenders, internal enforcers are then expected to punish
said employees by terminating their employment and disclosing their
names to government authorities.207
The rhetoric of corporate policing is very much suffused with
notions of public enforcement and duty. As Professors William
Bratton and Michael Wachter observe in their discussion of the
federal government’s internal control requirements for publicly held
companies:
Most people, when they look at compliance systems, see
a new layer of mandated costs . . . . But something else
also is at work here: a corporate compliance officers is a
cop, a private sector cop pursuing a public goal.208
Thus, the policing approach reflects not simply the compliance
department’s discrete tasks, but rather its overall reason for being. It
exists to serve the public and it “exercises delegated public authority,
harnessing corporate resources toward public ends.”209
The second approach is an architectural approach.210 It relies
primarily on the structural strategy discussed in the preceding Section,
although it also draws on norms-based strategies. It seeks not only to
educate, but also to strengthen already nascent impulses to resist
temptations to violate the law. It finds some of its theoretical
grounding in systems theory, which focuses on decision-making
processes,211 and situational crime theory, which explores the ways in
206. Professor Harry First has advocated strongly for this “branch office” role. First, supra
note 64, at 64. For discussion on some of the drawbacks of corporate policing, see Miriam
Hechler Baer, Corporate Policing and Corporate Governance: What Can We Learn from
Hewlett-Packard’s Pretexting Scandal?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 523, 550–51 (2008) (citing Larry
Cata Backer, Surveillance and Control: Privatizing and Nationalizing Corporate Monitoring
After Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 327, 370–71).
207. It is not a coincidence that a number of recent law review articles have referred to the
Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower provisions as good or bad examples of “bounty-hunting.” See,
e.g., Justin Blount & Spencer Markel, The End of the Internal Compliance World as We Know
It, or an Enhancement of the Effectiveness of Securities Law Enforcement? Bounty Hunting
Under the Dodd-Frank Act’s Whistleblower Provisions, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1023
(2012).
208. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Tracking Berle’s Footsteps: The Trail of
The Modern Corporation’s Last Chapter, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 849, 872 (2010).
209. Id.
210. Cheng, supra note 137, at 662–63.
211. “Systems theory depicts organizations as converting external inputs (e.g., resources,
investment new recruits) into outputs (e.g., products and services) via a ‘throughput’ stage,
which comprises the organization’s entire operations and activities. See Nicole Gillespie &
Graham Dietz, Trust Repair After an Organization-Level Failure, 34 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 127,
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which geography and other contextual variables affect the incidence
of crime.212 Under this approach, the corporation’s systems are akin to
a dark alley or poorly traversed street. The corporate architect
identifies the corporation’s dark alleys and then attempts either to
eliminate or illuminate them.213
Undoubtedly, policing and architecture use some of the same
tools. Disclosure and reporting rules, for example, can simultaneously
provide a policing regime with necessary proof while also serving as a
structural device that deflects temptation at just the right moment.
“Monitoring” can serve either as a gentle check on our short-term
selves or as a heavy-handed form of oversight designed to deter all
but the most hardened opportunists.
Despite this overlap, several characteristics distinguish the two
approaches. The policeman’s goal (deter and punish) is distinctly
different from the architect’s (reduce temptation). Policemen and
architects communicate with their subjects differently and inspire
different reactions in corporate employees. And, as noted earlier,
policing serves a quasi-public end, whereas architecture seeks
generally to improve the inner workings of the firm.
Not surprisingly, the two approaches also imply different roles for
corporate compliance personnel. Since the policing approach places a
premium on investigations and sanctions, it favors an “external”
compliance department, staffed by lawyers214 and situated outside of
the corporation’s operational units.215 By contrast, the architect works
130 (2009).
212. “At the beginning of the twenty-first century, one of the most important and
underexplored forms of crime control is architecture.” Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as
Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039, 1041 (2002); see also Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit
Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 349–50 (2004) (explaining the general theory
and providing examples); Ronald V. Clarke, Situational Crime Prevention, 19 CRIME & JUST.
91, 93 (1995).
213. In a related vein, following the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
Professor Donald Langevoort praised the Act’s emphasis on internal controls, in part because
internal controls were likely to improve “corporate sightlines” and thereby reduce the
opportunity to engage in misconduct. Langevoort, supra note 53, at 969.
214. Whether lawyers improve or undermine the corporation’s compliance function is a
separate debate. Compare DeStefano, supra note 19 (arguing in favor of attorney involvement),
with Tanina Rostain, The Emergence of “Law Consultants,” 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1397, 1400
(2006) (observing concern that the use of lawyers in nonlegal compliance positions may cause
them to become overly technocratic and less wed to “public values”).
215. For an argument that corporate compliance has been unnecessarily “decoupled” from
the rest of the organization and that integration of the compliance function with the rest of the
organization is necessary to improve corporate culture, see Blount & Markel, supra note 207, at
1060–61; compare Larry E. Ribstein, Delawyering the Corporation, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 305,
307 (2012), for an argument that the corporation’s in-house legal department may one day
dissolve. For an argument that oversight should come from someone who was not a party to an
original operational decision, see Medwed, supra note 21, at 88.
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side by side with the employees and officers who make operational
decisions.216
The architectural approach incorporates some of the teachings of
the corporate values movement that first emerged in the 1990s,217 and
it bears a strong resemblance to the New Governance regulatory
agenda that has become increasingly popular within the past two
decades.218 The architect may persuade, and indeed at times regulate,
but she generally does not punish. The approach additionally reflects
more recent arguments regarding the proper direction in which inhouse counsel’s role ought to evolve. For example, shortly before his
death, Professor Larry Ribstein forecasted that the in-house legal
function would eventually devolve back into the corporation-atlarge;219 he referred to this process as “delawyering.”220 With respect
to corporate compliance, Ribstein imagined a world in which
“[l]awyers would function . . . as architects and engineers rather than
as mechanics applying rules.”221
C. Substitutes and Complements
The previous section introduced two enforcement approaches,
policing and architecture. The two approaches can function either as
substitutes or complements.
Consider, first, the tradeoffs the two approaches pose. The
216. Cf. Ribstein, supra note 215, at 315–16 (describing how software can be designed to
assist decision makers).
217. See Kathleen M. Boozang & Simone Handler-Hutchinson, “Monitoring” Corporate
Corruption: DOJ’s Use of Deferred Prosecution Agreements in Health Care, 35 AM. J. L. &
MED. 89, 105–06 (2009) (distinguishing between discipline and values orientations in
compliance programs); David Hess, Robert S. McWhorter & Timothy L. Fort, The 2004
Amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Their Implicit Call for a Symbiotic
Integration of Business Ethics, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 725, 733−34 (2006)
(distinguishing a “compliance-based” approach from an “integrity-based” approach); Regan,
supra note 197, at 970–73 (describing differences between a “values based” and deterrencebased compliance program).
218. Professor Cunningham notes this “philosophical shift away from traditional
deterrence-oriented strategies toward more cooperative and rewards-oriented systems to
promote compliance.” Lawrence A. Cunningham, Beyond Liability: Rewarding Effective
Gatekeepers, 92 MINN. L. REV. 323, 324 (2007). For more on New Governance generally, see
Jason M. Solomon, Law and Governance in the 21st Century Regulatory State, 86 TEX. L. REV.
819, 821–37 (2008) (book review) (describing New Governance literature and suggesting
future directions for New Governance scholarship) and Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall
of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV.
342 (2004) (discussing the emergence, rationales, and motivations of New Governance theory,
the organizing principles of the New Governance model, and its practical application in
employment, environmental, and digital technology law).
219. Ribstein, supra note 215, at 307.
220. The title of Ribstein’s article was Delawyering the Corporation. See id. at 305.
221. Id. at 316.
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policing approach may not be particularly uplifting, but it is an
essential component of any compliance program. Temporally
consistent, opportunistic individuals pose a constant threat to widely
dispersed shareholders within publicly held corporations.
Shareholders demand objective and periodic proof of corporate
performance, to both eliminate shirking and ensure that they have
invested their capital appropriately. Not all employees and officers
will meet their performance goals, however, leading some to decide to
cheat and commit some variant of fraud.222 Over the long run,
temporally consistent opportunists will perpetrate the worst schemes
and the best cover-ups. Since hiring screens inevitably fail, the
corporation has no choice but to utilize policing tools to investigate
and identify wrongdoers.223
Policing, however, imposes a number of costs. First, the
corporation’s policemen are likely to develop interests in maintaining
and increasing their positions of power within the organization, quite
apart from actual threats to corporate integrity.224 Turf-building
presents opportunity costs.
Second, policing, as noted earlier, may unintentionally erode
compliance norms. For example, heavy-handed methods may trigger
feelings of distrust among employees, thereby reducing internal
motivations to comply with the law. This is particularly likely if
employees believe the corporation has violated their privacy or has
imposed an excessive sanction in relation to a given type of
misconduct. Finally, policing may create a false sense of security in
putative victims, causing them to assume incorrectly that they can
relax their vigilance because sanctions and oversight mechanisms
have been enacted.225
Like its counterpart, corporate architecture is also an essential
component of an effective compliance program. It is both proactive
222. On the connection between performance failure and fraud, see generally Arlen &
Carney, supra note 57 (attributing fraud to “final period” problems); Velikonja, supra note 60,
at 1908–09. But see Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, New Evidence on the Origins of
Corporate Crime, 17 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 421, 432–33 (1996) (finding weaker and
not statistically significant correlations between prior performance and corporate fraud in data
on public companies from 1975–1989).
223. Nagin et al., supra note 180, at 854 (concluding that because screens fail, corporate
firms will “therefore have a proportion of employees who will find the short-term gains from
shirking quite irresistible” and that responding to such impulses “requires the imposition of
costs that are as immediate and near at hand as the gains from shirking”).
224. Within larger corporations, budgets for corporate compliance now number in the
millions. See, e.g., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, BROADER PRESPECTIVES; HIGHER
PERFORMANCE: STATE OF COMPLIANCE: 2012 STUDY 9, 16–17 [hereinafter PWC STUDY],
http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/risk-management/assets/2012-compliance-study.pdf.
225. See generally Amitai Aviram, Counter-Cyclical Enforcement of Corporate Law, 24
YALE J. REG. 1 (2008).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss1/2

50

Baer: Confronting the Two Faces of Corporate Fraud

2014]

CONFRONTING THE TWO FACES OF CORPORATE FRAUD

137

and potentially innovative. It can reduce both the temptation and
opportunity to commit wrongdoing, while also providing adequate
space for employees and officers to pursue risky but net positive
projects.
To be sure, architecture poses its own set of drawbacks.
Oversight, particularly the type of pervasive oversight imagined here,
can be time-consuming and expensive. Speed bumps in corporate
decision-making can translate into sluggishness in operations.226
Chinese walls, which reduce wrongdoing by fencing off information,
can also cause information holes and inefficiency. At its worst, the
architectural approach may fuel a kind of bureaucratic secondguessing that squelches risk-taking and innovation and that
inadvertently rewards shirking and risk aversion.
These worries were exactly the types of concerns raised when
Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which all but
demanded additional architecture—and policing—for corporate firms
by holding management accountable for inadequate “internal
controls.”227 The Act eliminated plausible deniability for CEO and
CFO’s insofar as they were now forced to certify financial statements
and attest to the reliability of the firm’s internal financial reporting
mechanisms.228 In addition, the Act required the company’s outside
auditor to attest to management’s commitment to maintaining the
company’s internal controls.229 Thus, one could point to the Act’s
internal control requirements and conclude that the legislation
provided the necessary impetus for improving corporate
226. Chris Durden & Richard Pech, The Increasing Cost of Corporate Governance:
Decision Speed Bumps for Managers, 6 CORP. GOVERNANCE 84, 92 (2006).
227. Professors Bratton and Wachter perceive the internal controls provisions of the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as a kind of policing, “forcing
corporations to participate directly in the enforcement enterprise.” Bratton & Wachter, supra
note 208, at 872. By contrast, Professor Utset perceives provisions such as the certification
requirement in § 302 as a valuable deflection device that “make[s] more salient—at the point in
time when a manager makes a securities filing—the costs she would incur if she were to fail to
comply with federal securities laws.” Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals, supra note 18, at 658.
228. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302, 116 Stat. 745, 777–78
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.). On eliminating
plausible deniability by forcing certification, see Hillary A. Sale, Public Governance, 81 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1012, 1025 (2013).
229. Id. § 404. Section 302 requires the CFO and CEO to certify in each quarterly filing
that they have reviewed the filing and that it “fairly represents” the company’s financial
condition and does not contain, to the best of their knowledge, any misstatement. Id. § 302. In
addition, § 302 requires the CFO and CEO to attest that they are responsible for ensuring
adequate internal controls, that they have evaluated the effectiveness of said controls, and that
they have discussed any changes in those controls. Id. Section 404 requires management to
include in the corporation’s annual report an assessment “of the effectiveness of the internal
control structure and procedures of the issuer for financial reporting,” which then must be
attested to by the corporation’s outside auditor. Id. § 404.
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architecture.230
Critics, however, vehemently disagreed with this happy story.
Instead, they claimed the “architecture” that emerged from SarbanesOxley was too costly (at least for smaller firms), overly standardized,
and largely politically motivated.231 Moreover, as Professor John
Coffee explains, the attestation requirement in § 404 eventually led to
the situation whereby auditors conducted a “dual audit” of the
corporation: “first, a traditional audit of the issuer's financial
statements and, second, an audit of the issuer’s internal controls.”232
In sum, to the extent Sarbanes-Oxley represented a move toward
enhanced corporate architecture, it was (to its critics) the worst kind
of architecture: expensive, government-mandated, and one that
ultimately transferred the shareholders’ wealth to outside auditors.233
Responding to the above critiques, Sarbanes-Oxley’s proponents
have questioned whether corporations could or would have credibly
improved their internal reporting devices on their own.234 They also
contend that the business community exaggerated the Act’s
compliance costs and conveniently ignored “its countervailing
benefits.”235
Although largely beyond the scope of this Article, the debate
illuminates architecture’s key challenges. Because it is more
qualitative than quantitative, it is difficult for outsiders to verify
architecture’s existence.236 For that reason, and particularly in the
230. One might also have concluded, as Professor Cunningham did, that a number of
Sarbanes-Oxley’s provisions merely amplified pre-existing requirements. Lawrence A.
Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Might Just
Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 918 (2003).
231. The classic critiques include William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After
Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of “Going Private,” 55 EMORY L.J. 141 (2006) (arguing that
excessive compliance costs associated with § 404 will cause public firms to go private or
delist); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005) (questioning empirical support for several key
provisions in Act); and also Larry Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Reponses to Corporate
Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 39 (2002) (similar
arguments).
232. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform
Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1038
(2012). Coffee observes that the dual audit feature was not mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley itself,
but came about because of a ruling by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. Id.
233. Id. (citing argument that dual audits enriched auditing profession).
234. See generally Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack
Corporate Governance: How Wise is the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L.J. 1843 (2007).
235. Robert Prentice, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Evidence Regarding the Impact of SOX 404,
29 CARDOZO L. REV. 703, 703 (2007).
236. Assessing and demonstrating compliance effectiveness has become an important
issue for compliance officers. See PWC STUDY, supra note 224, at 12–13. For more on the
observability of compliance efforts and how it may shape internal compliance decisions, see
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wake of public scandals, legislators and regulators are not likely to
permit regulated entities to devise their own antifraud architecture.
Instead, public actors will be inclined to mandate blunt and politically
popular “fixes.”
Although the foregoing discussion has discussed architecture and
policing’s relative strengths and weaknesses, the two are not solely
substitutes. In numerous instances, they are complements.
For example, structures that stress disclosure or require multiple
signatories on filed documents deflect momentary lapses of judgment
(architecture), but also make it easier to identify rogues and rank
opportunists after the fact (policing). Good processes make policing
more effective, which in turn reduces opportunities and incentives to
cheat.
At the same time, policing can make architecture more effective.
Recall that “structure” can include anything from a narrowly crafted
deflection device (a certification requirement or checklist) to a drastic
reduction in options (a decision not to do any business in China in
order to eliminate the possibility of bribing government officials). The
more drastic structures reduce opportunities for innovation and
legitimate business activity but otherwise ensure legal compliance.
One cannot easily violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act if one’s
company declines to do work overseas. But that also means foregoing
lucrative opportunities across the globe.
Much of the legal scholarship on “structure” has focused on the
differences between ex ante and ex post responses to wrongdoing.237
A different, yet equally important question is how enforcers structure
requirements optimally. If an enforcer chooses a “structural” device,
how sharply should that structural device cut? As much as we want
Ulysses to foreclose the option of steering the ship in the wrong
direction, we still want him to sail home. Which factors enable the
corporate architect to fine-tune and customize devices such that they
reduce some options, but do not wholly foreclose others?
Here, credible policing may play some salutary role. As Professor
Jon Elster observed, a number of precommitment devices depend on
third parties in order to function effectively:
Ulysses did not bind himself to the mast; he had himself
tied by the rowers and made sure that they could not hear
any counterorders he might issue. People who want to
force themselves to save can join a Christmas Club,
Alexander S. P. Pfaff & Chris William Sanchirico, Environmental Self-Auditing: Setting the
Proper Incentives for Discovery and Correction of Environmental Harm, 16 J. L. ECON. &
ORG. 189, 198 (2000) (discussing observability problem).
237. See, e.g., Cheng, supra note 137, at 657.
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which will be deaf to any demands for withdrawal of the
funds before December 15. . . . What is common to these
and many other cases is that the individual can enlist
others in the effort to bind himself.238
Elster’s insight is important: for precommitment devices to
function effectively, we need reliable third parties who can help us
bind ourselves to our original commitments. If those upon whom we
depend are opportunistic and have an interest in seeing us fail, masttying and Christmas clubs quickly lose their value. Accordingly, if
corporate enforcers can be “bribed” into acquiescence, as critics claim
was the case with auditors in the late 1990s and credit rating agencies
in the lead-up to the 2008 financial crisis,239 then some level of
policing is necessary to ensure that the enforcers and their overseers
maintain a genuine interest in complying with the law.
How do we solve this recursive problem whereby corporate
enforcers themselves are so opportunistic or feckless that they fail to
implement or maintain existing architectural devices? Here, policing,
particularly the type of policing aimed strategically at the worst and
most obvious offenders, may assist in the development and
refinement of corporate architecture.240 By screening out and
deterring the most dangerous and opportunistic wrongdoers, policing
can provide the rest of the community the space to devise structures
that are permissive and yet disabling in the right proportions.
IV. CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND THE PREFERENCE FOR
POLICING
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, corporations must
confront two dispositions at the same time: the tendency to be
temporally inconsistent and the motivation to harm or take advantage
of others. Examining the interaction between these dispositions, in
turn, reveals a four-part typology that suggests differing levels of
danger among corporate employees and officers. Fraud, in turn, arises
out of a combination of planned and spur-of-the-moment misconduct.
The corporation’s internal enforcer therefore must arm himself with
238. Jon Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge Before You Come to It: Some Ambiguities and
Complexities of Precommitment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1759 (2003).
239. See, e.g., Jodi L. Short, Competing Normative Frameworks and the Limits of
Deterrence Theory: Comments on Baker and Griffith’s Ensuring Corporate Misconduct, 38
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 493, 497−98 (2013) (comparing auditor failures with credit rating agency
failures).
240. For the differences between “randomized,” “comprehensive,” and “strategic”
policing models, along with an endorsement of the benefits of a strategic policing model that
targets the worst offenders, see Margaret H. Lemos & Alex Stein, Strategic Enforcement, 95
MINN. L. REV. 9, 9−12 (2010).

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss1/2

54

Baer: Confronting the Two Faces of Corporate Fraud

2014]

CONFRONTING THE TWO FACES OF CORPORATE FRAUD

141

some combination of policing and architecture.
Ideally, internal corporate enforcers would choose the most costeffective mix of approaches, depending on the context and attendant
risks. In this perfect world, internal enforcers would choose those
combinations of screening, transformation, and structural strategies
that best reflect their employee population and their company’s
particular risk profile. Professor Omari Scott Simmons analogizes this
contextual, global approach to an immune system that relies on a
varied set of adaptive responses in order to minimize external stress
and restore “internal equilibrium.”241 Although broader in scope,
Simmons’s analogy envelops the pluralistic enforcement approach
suggested here.
But what if certain factors skew the internal corporate enforcer’s
analysis in one direction? Which approach would we expect to
dominate, and how would this outcome affect the corporation’s
internal response to corporate fraud?
This final Part explores these questions, first by discussing the rise
of the modern corporate compliance program, and then by
constructing a theoretical account of why stakeholders inside and
outside the corporation may push its compliance effort excessively
towards policing and away from architectural progress.
A. The Emergence of Corporate Compliance and Risk Management
Not long after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,242
Professor Manuel Utset theorized that temporal inconsistency might
have played a role in the corporate fraud accounting scandals that had
preceded the Act.243 He theorized that gatekeeping—including the
creation of oversight and surveillance systems within the firm—
required extensive up-front costs.244 If corporate gatekeepers were
temporally inconsistent, Utset reasoned, then they would rationally
procrastinate beefing up oversight programs, to the long-term
detriment of the company.245 Given this fear, Sarbanes-Oxley’s
emphasis on internal compliance and enhanced internal corporate
controls made sense, as it effectively forced corporate gatekeepers to

241. Omari Scott Simmons, The Corporate Immune System: Governance from the Inside
Out, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1131, 1151–53.
242. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
243. See Utset, supra note 8, at 434.
244. See id. at 435.
245. Id. at 434–35 (casting the problem as arising primarily at the corporate board level).
“[G]atekeepers may have had a long-term preference to actively monitor and discipline
managers, but they repeatedly procrastinated following through.” Id. at 434.
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“commit” to corporate compliance.246
Of course, many of the external incentives to develop a corporate
compliance program were already in place by the time SarbanesOxley was enacted.247 The compliance profession first emerged in the
1960’s and grew throughout the end of the century.248 Deferred
prosecution agreements, the primary settlement tool for criminal
prosecutions of corporations, first surfaced in the 1990s.249 The U.S.
Sentencing Commission’s Organizational Guidelines were first
promulgated in 1991 and then revised in 2004 pursuant to the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in order to further define the meaning of an
“effective compliance and ethics program.”250 The Organizational
Guidelines significantly reduce criminal sanctions for those
organizations that adopt an “effective” internal compliance
program.251 During the same time period, the SEC implemented its
own deferred prosecution regime, memorialized in what is commonly
known as the Seaboard Report, which offered the promise of leniency
for corporations that implemented compliance programs and selfreported evidence of wrongdoing.252
Meanwhile, the related but distinct “enterprise risk management”
(ERM) industry also emerged and expanded during this time
period.253 Enterprise risk management enables firms to identify and
246. Id. at 442 (theorizing that Sarbanes-Oxley’s internal controls and certification
requirements acted as precommitment devices to counteract gatekeeper tendencies toward
procrastination).
247. See Rostain, supra note 214, at 1402 (tracing the rise of the “compliance consulting
industry” to the enactment of the Federal Organizational Sentencing Guidelines in 1991).
248. “Compliance officers in the U.S. securities industry began to meet as early as the
1960s with their 1996 conference having over 2200 participants.” Parker, supra note 185, at
344.
249. John Gibeaut, A Matter of Opinion: Speakers Debate Whether Deferred Prosecution
Agreements Help Corporations, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2006, at 58, 58.
250. The Guidelines offer the possibility of a reduced sentence for convicted corporations
that nevertheless maintained “effective” compliance programs. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(a) & cmt. background (2012).
251. See Paul Fiorelli & Ann Marie Tracey, Why Comply? Organizational Guidelines
Offer a Safer Harbor in the Storm, 32 J. CORP. L. 467, 467–68 (2007) (stating there is a
potential “80:1 swing in what a company may have to pay in federal fines, depending on
whether it had good ethics and compliance programs, or bad ethics and compliance programs”).
252. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SECTION
21(A) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 AND COMMISSION STATEMENT ON THE
RELATIONSHIP OF COOPERATION TO AGENCY ENFORCEMENT DECISIONS, Exchange Act Release
No. 44,969 (Oct. 23, 2001) [hereinafter SEABOARD REPORT], available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm; see also Matt A. Vega, Beyond
Incentives: Making Corporate Whistleblowing Moral in the New Era of Dodd-Frank Act
“Bounty-Hunting,” 45 CONN. L. REV. 483, 517–18 & n.194 (2012) (summarizing and
explaining the relevance of the Seaboard Report and why it has acquired that name).
253. See Betty Simkins & Steven A. Ramirez, Enterprise-Wide Risk Management and
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reduce a variety of enterprise-wide risks, including the risk that
employees may break the law.254 The ERM framework, which was
developed by the Treadway Commission’s Committee of Sponsoring
Organizations (COSO),255 was released in 2004,256 two years after
Sarbanes-Oxley’s enactment. The framework expands upon a number
of principles that COSO previously articulated in its “Internal
Framework,” which would eventually become the Sarbanes-Oxley
benchmark for testing internal financial reporting controls within
public corporations.257 “Internal controls” in turn, had been a topic of
interest to lawmakers and regulators since at least the 1970s.258
In sum, plenty of compliance-related “commitment devices” were
in place prior to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the
emphasis on compliance only expanded in Sarbanes-Oxley’s wake.
More than a decade following the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, both
“compliance” and “risk management” have become key functions
within public corporations.259 That does not mean, however, that
fraud is no longer a realistic concern, particularly if compliance
programs lack the optimal mix of policing and architecture.
At first glance, compliance and risk management programs are
Corporate Governance, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 571, 580–81, 583–84 (2008).
254. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP.
L. 967, 969 (2009) (“Enterprise risk management is the process by which a business
organization anticipates, prevents, and responds to uncertainties associated with the
organization’s strategic objectives. . . . [It] is the process by which business organizations
proactively determine the types and levels of risk appropriate for achieving the organization’s
strategic goals.” (footnote omitted)); Deborah A. DeMott, The Stages of Scandal and the Roles
of General Counsel, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 463, 468–69 (“Enterprise risk management incorporates
corporate governance as a mechanism of managing behavioral risks with financial and
technical risk management”); see also Michelle M. Harner, Ignoring the Writing on the Wall:
The Role of Enterprise Risk Management in the Economic Crisis, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 45, 47
(2010) (arguing that financial institutions’ inattention to ERM contributed to the financial
crisis).
255. COSO comprises the major accounting trade organizations. About Us, COMMITTEE
SPONSORING ORGS. TREADWAY COMMISSION, http://www.coso.org/aboutus.htm (last visited
Feb. 10, 2014).
256. Id. (“Regarding ERM, in 2004 COSO issued Enterprise Risk Management –
Integrated Framework.”).
257. See Langevoort, supra note 53, at 953–55 (describing emergence of COSO’s internal
controls framework and status as the de facto benchmark for demonstrating adequate internal
controls for Sarbanes-Oxley).
258. Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to Fight
Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J. CORP. L. 267, 273 (2004) (tracing the emergence of internal
controls regulation back thirty years). For the differences between financial and compliance
controls, see id. at 277.
259. A 2012 report by PricewaterhouseCoopers and Compliance Week indicated that
compliance officers’ jurisdiction within their corporations and budgets were increasing. PWC
STUDY, supra note 224, at 16.
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exactly the types of platforms that should accommodate the policing
and architectural approaches. One could imagine compliance
personnel and risk managers working side by side, the former
focusing on policing and the latter implementing and perfecting
precommitment devices. Alternately, one could imagine a platform
that integrated both goals and approaches at the same time, with
compliance and risk managers drawing upon both approaches
simultaneously.260 Moreover, legislation such as Sarbanes-Oxley
would appear to encourage architecture as much as it encourages
corporate policing. It requires firms to strengthen internal monitoring
systems, but as Professor Utset has approvingly pointed out, it also
demands the implementation of temptation-reducing devices such as
prohibitions on loans to officers and requirements that the
corporation’s CEO and CFO attest to the reliability and health of the
company’s internal controls.261 Ideally, the emergence of these two
related and overlapping industries ought to have made corporations—
and the economies and industries in which they operate—safer
investments and less prone to scandal and misreporting.
So much for the idealized vision. Even with fewer financial
reporting scandals, few would argue that the compliance and riskmanagement industries have lived up to their promise. The 2008
Financial Crisis undercuts any notion of effective risk management, at
least with regard to financial firms.262 JPMorgan’s recent “London
Whale” debacle—in which one of its traders acquired a massive
position in risky derivative bets and ultimately caused the bank to lose
in excess of six billion dollars—stands as a more recent example of
inadequate risk management.263
In a similar vein, proponents of the Dodd-Frank Act have argued
that the directors and managers of financial institutions caused so
much harm to the economy precisely because they lacked either the
ability or the incentive to properly manage risk.264 At the same time,
260. For the overlapping roles of risk management and compliance assurance for
corporate directors and an argument that risk management and compliance are similar “in kind”
but differ “in degree,” see Bainbridge, supra note 254, at 978–84.
261. See discussion supra at pp. 50–51.
262. See Harner, supra note 254, at 47; Renee M. Jones & Michelle Welsh, Toward a
Public Enforcement Model for Directors’ Duty of Oversight, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 343,
345–46 (2012).
263. See, e.g., Kathryn Judge, Interbank Discipline, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1262, 1288 (2013)
(explaining the scandal and observing that banks “all too often fail to accurately assess their
own risk exposures”). For arguments that risk management failures were limited largely to
financial institutions, see Brian R. Cheffins, Did Corporate Governance “Fail” During the
2008 Stock Market Meltdown? The Case of the S&P 500, 65 BUS. LAW. 1, 3 (2009).
264. See Jones & Welsh, supra note 262, at 346 (“Directors remained blind to significant
departures from approved risk management guidelines and failed to detect flaws in financial
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corporate compliance officers within those institutions have also
come under fire.265 Much hand-wringing occurred, for example, when
it became clear that JPMorgan not only allowed excessively risky
trading, but also failed to disclose the full size of its losses promptly
and transparently. The bank’s problems inhered not solely in its
management of risk, but also in its reporting of material losses, a core
compliance function.266
Even putting aside financial firms, which may be sui generis, the
evidence is mixed on how well the modern compliance program
works.267 Although there now exists a plethora of corporate
compliance tools, as well as organizations that provide specialized
consulting services to corporations seeking the reduction of
wrongdoing,268 fraud and deceptive practices continue to arise,
particularly in the wake of market downturns and recessions.269 True,
a particular method of fraud may decline in the wake of a series of
investigations and prosecutions.270 But misrepresentation and similar
reporting practices that led to systematic underreporting of leverage and the concealment of
devastating losses.”).
265. This criticism is not new. Lori Richards, then the SEC’s Director of the Office of
Compliance Inspections and Examinations, addressed a meeting of compliance professionals in
2005, stating in part:
[O]ver the last several years, . . . [t]errible scandals had come to light, with
large scale dishonesty, serious breaches of fiduciary duty, violations by wellknown leaders of the securities industry, and misconduct of some audacity. I
often had the unfortunate duty of asking you - “where was compliance?”
Specifically I asked: “Where was compliance when these problems arose, took
shape, and became entrenched in the offending firms?”
Lori Richards, Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections & Examinations, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, Remarks before the Nat’l Soc’y of Compliance Prof’ls Nat’l Membership Meeting
(Oct. 25, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch102605lr.htm).
266. JPMorgan’s compliance weaknesses were particularly surprising in light of the fact
that the bank’s chief compliance officer was Stephen Cutler, a former chief of the SEC’s
Enforcement Division. See James B. Stewart, When Trying to Follow Rules Isn’t Enough, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 20, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/21/business/atjpmorgan-trying-to-do-the-right-thing-isnt-enough.html (discussing JPMorgan’s compliance
failures).
267. For a discussion on the inherent limitations of internal controls, see Cunningham,
supra note 258. For a more specific argument on how corporate compliance regulation has
gone awry, and for a warning that emphasis on “corporate compliance” may ultimately produce
“greater individual ‘white collar’ deviance,” see Laufer, supra note 190, at 1350.
268. For the growth of the compliance industry, see Baer, supra note 20, at 993–99; see
also Cunningham, supra note 258, at 269 (observing that the emphasis on “internal controls”
has helped the auditing and legal professions).
269. Rapp, supra note 57, at 104.
270. For example, Kathleen Boozang and Simone Handler-Hutchinson observe with
regard to the health care context:
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types of wrongdoing appear to be quite sticky.271 If financial reporting
fraud is not the problem it was in 1999, we still have to worry about
international bribery and other alternative types of wrongdoing that
have yet to surface. Indeed, this is one of the reasons why the federal
criminal fraud statutes are so notoriously open-ended.272
The evidence on specific corporate settlements between
corporations and prosecutors or the SEC is not much better. In
separate studies, Professors Jayne Barnard and Brandon Garrett both
praise monitors and structural settlements that address the specific
situational factors that encourage misconduct.273 At the same time,
both find shortcomings in these programs. Barnard, who interviewed
corporate defense attorneys, reports that “everybody hates” the
compliance consultants because they are “expensive and
disruptive.”274 She further reports that structural terms are
idiosyncratic and depend largely on the involvement of particular
SEC Enforcement Division personnel.275 She notes further that much
of the negotiation tends to boil down to the question of how many
executives the company is willing to fire.276 From this perspective,
compliance sounds much more like a “check-the-box effort” and
hardly like an idealized mix of pluralistic governance approaches.
Garrett, who has studied a number of domestic and foreign
corporation settlements with state and federal prosecutors, finds
The two decades of anti-kickback enforcement has been a cat-and-mouse
game between enforcers and the health industry. The government promulgates
safe harbor regulations, guidelines, fraud alerts, opinion letters, and [corporate
integrity agreements] signaling behaviors it deems illegal and the principles
underlying its legal interpretations. Industry then eliminates those practices but
adopts alternative practices that have not been expressly prohibited.
Boozang & Handler-Hutchinson, supra note 217, at 98.
271. See ERNST & YOUNG, GROWING BEYOND: A P LACE FOR INTEGRITY: 12TH GLOBAL
FRAUD SURVEY 2, 4 (2012), http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Global-Fraud-Survey-aplace-for-integrity-12th-Global-Fraud-Survey/$FILE/EY-12th-GLOBAL-FRAUD-SURVEY.pdf
(noting that the risk of fraud is increasing); see also Pamela H. Bucy et al., Why Do They Do It?:
The Motives, Mores, and Character of White Collar Criminals, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 401,
404–05 (2008) (citing the Association of Certified Fraud Examiner’s study regarding
prevalence of fraud in corporations and other organizations).
272. Cf. Joseph W. Yockey, Choosing Governance in the FCPA Reform Debate, 38 J.
CORP. L. 325, 338 (contending that “a certain degree of ambiguity is necessary to fulfill the
FCPA’s purpose of deterring corruption”).
273. Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Therapeutics at the Securities and Exchange
Commission, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 793, 794–95; Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform
Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 936 (2007).
274. Barnard, supra note 273, at 817 (internal quotation marks omitted).
275. Id. at 818–19.
276. Id. at 828. But see id. (“[T]he defenestration of top managers in anticipation of
settlement is less common than it was just two years ago.”).
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evidence of good-faith attempts to improve internal compliance, along
with some alarming examples of prosecutorial rent-seeking.277 Like
Barnard, Garrett finds a lack of uniformity in compliance
requirements, and little evidence that prosecutors keep track of these
reforms after they impose them.278 Some of Garrett’s concerns have
been echoed by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO),
whose December 2009 report to Congress observed that the
Department of Justice (DOJ) had just begun to improve its internal
tracking of outstanding deferred prosecution (DPA) and
nonprosecution (NPA) agreements,279 but that the DOJ had yet to
figure out how to measure their individual and overall effectiveness:
“DOJ lacks performance measures to assess how DPAs and NPAs
contribute to its efforts to combat corporate crime.”280 Apparently in
response to this problem, the DOJ noted in its 2013 budget proposal
that putting in place a tracking system that ensures that corporate
offenders are abiding by the terms of their settlement agreements was
a “Priority Goal.”281 Even this additional information—however
valuable—fails to tell us how effective compliance is in reducing
wrongdoing.
Thus, the compliance industry’s ultimate value remains unverified.
Why? Some might conclude that the problem is that the government
and corporate entities have embraced compliance and risk
management in an overly ad hoc matter; others might contend that
corporate officers and directors, who have no true interest in reducing
the incidence of wrongdoing, simply abuse these platforms for their
own purposes.282 Still others might argue that compliance and risk
management are relatively young and nascent disciplines and that true
277. Garrett, supra note 273, at 857, 860.
278. Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775, 1847
(2011) (“The compliance measures that prosecutors require range widely and it is not clear to
what extent prosecutors review or supervise their effectiveness.”).
279. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-110, CORPORATE CRIME: DOJ HAS
TAKEN STEPS TO BETTER TRACK ITS USE OF DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS,
BUT SHOULD EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS 17 (2009), http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/299781.pdf
(noting that the DOJ had just begun to track deferred prosecution and non-prosecution
agreements issued by component departments and United States Attorneys’ Offices).
280. Introduction to id.; see also id. at 21.
281. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SUMMARY OF 2013 BUDGET REQUEST AND PERFORMANCE,
(2013),
http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2013summary/pdf/fy13-bud-summary-request14
performance.pdf.
282. See First, supra note 64, at 91–92 (worrying that the possibility of deferred
prosecution agreement reduces corporations’ incentives to self-police). A variant of this
argument is that policing imposes a “placebo effect” on potential victims, causing them to
become less vigilant because they assume others will detect and punish wrongdoing. See
Amitai Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law: Law’s Role in Manipulating Perceptions, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 54, 57–61 (2006).
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best practices have yet to emerge.283
All of these arguments are plausible. It may be, however, that our
laws encourage a certain mix of compliance strategies that hinders the
development of effective responses to corporate misconduct. The next
section considers this possibility in greater detail.
B. Understanding the Preference for Policing
Assuming some mix of temporal inconsistency and opportunistic
motivation, the ideal compliance program would include both
architectural and policing approaches to the risk of wrongdoing. It
would include strategies designed to confront temporal inconsistency
as well as more covert efforts to identify and root out rank
opportunism. It would include audits and swift sanctions, but it also
would include an array of precommitment devices and structural
protections. It would promote overt monitoring and gentle reminders,
but it would also countenance covert investigations and periodic
punishments of willful misconduct.
As Section IV.A suggested, however, certain groups skew
corporate choices in the direction of policing and away from
architecture. This Section provides a thumbnail sketch of who those
groups are and why they prefer policing.
1. Moral Objectors and Government Enforcers
Those who perceive corporate wrongdoing as a distinctly moral
transgression may prefer policing to architecture because policing is
intimately related to punishment.284 If corporate wrongdoing is the
result of morally objectionable conduct, then wrongdoing merits
punishment. Punishment, in turn, entails the singling out of
individuals who have harmed others. From this perspective, policing
should predominate, since it serves as the precursor to corporate
283. For a discussion of compliance “best practices” and the observation that “best
practices” established by so-called compliance experts are being bypassed by Dodd-Frank
“bounty-hunting,” see Vega, supra note 252, at 519–20. See David Zaring, Best Practices, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 298 (2006) for an argument that “best practice[]” regimes can devolve into
“common practice[]” regimes.
284. Professor Deborah DeMott has criticized ERM’s “neutral” systems-based language
for failing to take into account the normative aspects of legal noncompliance:
To the extent the law is treated as simply a source of “risk” that may for this
purpose be homogenized with risks stemming from other sources, it is
incorporated within a risk-management framework as another constraint on
conduct, “not norms that express views of right conduct or desirable states of
the world.”
DeMott, supra note 254, at 469 (quoting Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The
Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1192 (2003)).
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discipline, which in turn functions as a kind of punishment for
individual corporate officers and directors.285
Along the same vein, public enforcers also skew the compliance
officer’s calculus in favor of policing.286 From the public enforcer’s
perspective, corporate policing serves two ends. It helps the
government prosecute and punish wrongdoers after harm has occurred
and it enhances deterrence before harm occurs.287 Because of
information asymmetries, the corporation can self-police more easily
than external enforcers.288 The government’s reliance on corporate
compliance, in turn, frees up resources that it can then expend on
recidivist and (presumably) more dangerous firms.289
The key method by which prosecutors and regulators demand
policing is by defining the term “compliance” to include corporatewide investigative disciplinary measures. The Principles of Federal
Prosecution of Business Organizations, the primary guidance
document the DOJ publishes for its U.S. Attorneys’ Offices regarding
charging decisions for business organizations, explicitly advises
prosecutors to assess whether a corporation’s compliance program
functions effectively.290 The DOJ does not define the term “effective,”
but instead advises prosecutors to discern the difference between a
good-faith effort and a mere “paper program.”291
285. See Ellen S. Podgor, Educating Compliance, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1523, 1527
(2009) (“A highlight of most deferred prosecution agreements [between prosecutors and
corporations] is a requirement that the corporation cooperate with the government by providing
evidence of wrongdoing by individuals within the company.”).
286. See Buell, supra note 70, at 1625–26.
287. See id.
288. Professor Arlen has argued that corporations “are uniquely positioned to intervene ex
ante to deter crime through their ability to structure compensation and promotion policies so as
to make crime less profitable.” Jennifer Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability: Theory and
Evidence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL LAW 144, 144 (Alon
Harel & Keith N. Hylton eds., 2012).
Professor Buell contends that corporations are better positioned to police their own
employees. Buell, supra note 70, at 1626 (“The firm is much closer to the action, better
educated about the activities under scrutiny, and a more efficient user of enforcement
resources.”).
289. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 189, at 103–06; see also Kagan et al., supra
note 168, at 39 (observing reliance on internal compliance efforts, in part because “legal
coercion is expensive and difficult”). For an empirical analysis of self-policing and an
argument that “self-reporting can be a useful tool for reliably identifying and leveraging the
voluntary self-policing efforts of regulated companies,” see Michael W. Toffel & Jodi L. Short,
Coming Clean and Cleaning Up: Does Voluntary Self-Reporting Indicate Effective SelfPolicing?, 54 J.L. & ECON. 609, 611 (2011).
290. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-28.800(B)
(2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/28mcr
m.htm.
291. Id.
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Superficially, the principles are fairly open-ended, permitting the
corporate compliance officer to mix structural approaches with
standard policing efforts.292 Nevertheless, the DOJ reveals its
preference when it advises prosecutors to consider, among other
factors, “any remedial actions taken by the corporation, including, for
example, disciplinary action against past violators uncovered by the
prior compliance program.”293 As this statement makes clear, the
corporation’s safe harbor resides in substantial expenditures for
policing, not architecture. A record of aggressive audits followed by
swift terminations and corporate-wide shaming demonstrates to public
enforcers the corporation’s commitment to nurturing a law-abiding,
ethical culture. Experimentation with precommitment devices may be
the icing on the cake (particularly when they work well), but it is the
record of “remedial actions” and “disciplinary action against past
violators” that matters most to prosecutors when they consider a
corporate indictment.
Should there be any doubt as to this last point, consider a recent
organization-wide indictment, United States v. S.A.C. Capital
Advisors, LP.294 SAC, the eponymous hedge fund founded by Steven
A. Cohen, was indicted on charges that it failed to supervise its
employees and effectively permitted and encouraged insider
trading.295 The indictment was notable in that it demonstrated the
various ways in which SAC’s compliance program was an abject
failure—with regard to policing and architecture.296 Nevertheless, the
most memorable failures related to the department’s policing
function: the compliance department failed to screen employees;
lacked adequate monitoring systems; conducted few internal
investigations; and concluded from these few investigations that no
wrongdoing had occurred.297
SAC’s prosecution may well be salutary insofar as it encourages
the hedge fund industry to pay greater attention to compliance.
Nevertheless, a public indictment that highlights the various ways in
which a corporation’s compliance personnel failed to police
themselves will inevitably cause compliance officers at other
292. See id.
293. Id.
294. Sealed Indictment, United States v. S.A.C. Capital Advisors, L.P., No. 13-cr-00541
(S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/July13/S
ACChargingAndSupportingDocuments/SAC%20Indictment%20(Stamped).pdf; see also James
O’Toole, SAC Indictment Depicts Culture of Law-Breaking, CNNMONEY (July 30, 2013),
http://money.cnn.com/2013/07/26/investing/sac-insider-trading/index.html (describing the SAC
compliance department’s permissiveness).
295. Sealed Indictment, supra note 294, ¶ 1.
296. Id. passim.
297. Id. ¶¶ 24–29.
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companies to conclude that the remedy for insufficient compliance is
to bulk up one’s surveillance and internal punishment apparatus. With
the chair of the SEC announcing the Commission’s intention to make
itself into a “tougher cop,” one can hardly fault that choice.298
2. Monitoring Boards
The corporation’s board of directors, particularly its composition
and its members’ preferences, also affect the corporation’s choice of
policing and architectural approaches. Compliance officers often
report to the corporation’s board of directors, either indirectly,
through the corporation’s general counsel, or directly.299 Particularly
when corporate fraud is salient, board members care greatly about the
shape and content of the corporate compliance program.
Years ago, corporate scholars observed the transformation of the
American corporate board from one that provided strategic advice on
operations (the “managerial” board) to one that checked corporate
management’s tendency to shirk and take advantage of ill-informed
shareholders (the “monitoring” board).300 One of the hallmarks of the
monitoring board was that its members were independent, divorced
from the daily operations of the corporation.301 Independence, in turn,
would reduce conflicts of interest and ensure proper monitoring on
behalf of the corporation’s shareholders.302 In the wake of the
298. Sue Reisinger, SEC Chair Wants to Retool Agency as “Tough Cop,” CORPORATE
COUNSEL (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202621030557 (reporting on
Commissioner Mary Jo White’s “tough cop” speech to the Council of Institutional Investors in
Chicago).
299. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(2)(C) (2012)
(noting that person(s) responsible for daily compliance operations should “report periodically
to high-level personnel and, as appropriate, to the governing authority, [i.e., the board] or an
appropriate subgroup of the governing authority, on the effectiveness of the compliance and
ethics program”). As a result of the Guidelines, fewer corporations require its compliance
function to report directly to the corporation’s general counsel. PWC STUDY, supra note 224, at
16. For a discussion of the growing split between those corporations that lodge compliance
within the general counsel’s office and those that treat it as a separate, free-standing function,
see DeStefano, supra note 19.
300. See generally Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265, 268–
72 (1997) (describing the rise of the monitoring board).
301. See Ribstein, supra note 231, at 11 (“The basic theory is that the corporation’s main
decision-making body should include a majority of ‘independent’ directors who do not work
full-time for the corporation and therefore theoretically are in a position to watch over the
insiders, with wholly independent ‘audit’ and ‘nominating’ committees that work with the
company’s auditing firm and control election of directors.”).
302. See Sharpe, supra note 202, at 33 (“The contemporary model of corporate
governance reform has assumed that if the definition of independence is changed to include
more observable traits of independence, firms will perform better.”). Sharpe goes on to
question this view. See id. at 33 & n.192 (citing research indicating that firms with independent
directors do not necessarily perform better).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,

65

Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 1 [], Art. 2

152

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

accounting scandals in the late 1990s, the government and the stock
exchanges put in place a number of rules that altered the composition
and annual responsibility of board members. The stock exchanges’
listing requirements and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act require a publicly
traded company to maintain a majority of independent directors on its
boards, and an all-independent audit committee;303 the recently
enacted Dodd-Frank Act extends the independence obligation to
members of the board’s compensation committee.304
Putting aside the larger debate as to whether outsiders or insiders
are better positioned to monitor the corporation’s officers and
employees,305 it is not too difficult to see why an independent board
might prefer policing to architecture.306
Examining the firm’s architecture is a highly contextual and
qualitative exercise. It requires an outside director to invest a fair
amount of time learning about the corporation and the particular
device (or devices) that have been selected within each division. It
requires the director to understand the firm, its context, and the
particular commitment device. By contrast, policing is more
susceptible to quantitative measurement, even if that measurement is
itself misleading. A director can rely more easily on reports regarding
the number of audits performed, compliance personnel hired, and
incidences reported.307 Just as it is easier for a regulator to verify
policing, so too is it easier for an independent director to monitor
303. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 775–76
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)) (requiring an independent audit committee); Eric M. Fogel
& Andrew M. Geier, Strangers in the House: Rethinking Sarbanes-Oxley and the Independent
Board of Directors, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33, 39, 41–42 (2007) (noting that Sarbanes-Oxley did
not impose any requirements for independent directors, but that the New York Stock Exchange
and NASDAQ Stock Market “submitted to the SEC new listing standards” that required a
majority of independent directors).
304. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376, 1900–01 (2010).
305. Compare Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 233 (2002) (finding that
the belief that firms with more independent boards perform better is unsupported), and
Romano, supra note 231, at 1530–32 (noting that the literature suggests that “independent
boards do not improve performance and that boards with too many outsiders may . . . have a
negative impact on performance”), with Prentice & Spence, supra note 234, at 1844–45
(disagreeing with Romano).
306. For the inside versus outside director debate, see Simmons, supra note 241, at 1155–
57; for an analysis of the differences between in-house and external counsel as monitors of
corporate misconduct, see Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
411, 413–14 (2008).
307. According to the PricewaterhouseCoopers Compliance Survey conducted in 2012,
compliance officers rely on, among other metrics, audits, third party complaints, employee
disclosures, hotline reports, and training completion reports to gauge compliance effectiveness.
PWC STUDY, supra note 224, at 13.
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policing, particularly when that director sits on more than one board.
3. Managers
Corporate managers also should prefer policing to architecture.
The former may be intrusive, but corporate architecture poses a much
greater long-term threat to the corporate officer’s operational
discretion.308 By definition, precommitment devices narrow the
decision maker’s options. In contrast, policing leaves corporate
officers a “sporting chance” to escape detection and punishment.309
Opportunists optimistic about their abilities to avoid detection will
therefore choose policing over architecture.
More importantly, managers may reject corporate architecture for
entirely legitimate pro-social reasons. If a manager sincerely believes
that corporate compliance personnel are unskilled, risk averse, or
otherwise likely to prefer overly restrictive precommitment devices
that squelch innovation and competition in an aggressive market, the
manager’s choice represents nothing more than a rational attempt to
preserve the company’s operational performance.
4. Compliance Officers
Given the foregoing, compliance officers should also rationally
prefer policing to architecture, particularly if they believe they can
more easily validate policing in the event of a future compliance
failure.310 Indeed, should an affirmative “compliance defense” ever
materialize in corporate prosecutions, this preference is likely to
become even stronger.311 Quantitative efforts are simply easier to
demonstrate and verify than qualitative efforts, and where uncertainty
prevails, we should expect risk-averse compliance officers to seek
assurance from a bevy of easily proven policing efforts.
Readers should notice the feedback loop this preference creates for
the compliance industry itself. Law enforcement agencies prefer
policing because it increases their ability to identify and punish
wrongdoers. Compliance officers prefer policing because it is easier
308. Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 17, at 2–3 (providing examples of precommitment
strategies in corporations).
309. Cf. Cheng, supra note 137, at 681–83 (discussing speeding and a “sporting chance”).
310. See Yockey, supra note 272, at 357 (“[O]ne danger posed by the current enforcement
climate is that it encourages firms to focus primarily on compliance strategies they can defend
later should they happen to come under investigation.”).
311. A number of scholars and practitioners have argued for a corporate compliance
defense, particularly in regard to prosecutions of violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act. See, e.g., Mike Koehler, Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense,
2012 WIS. L. REV. 609. For a particularly thoughtful evaluation of the costs and benefits of
such a defense, see generally Peter J. Henning, Be Careful What You Wish for: Thoughts on a
Compliance Defense Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 883 (2012).
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to verify and, in any event, it appears to be the preferred approach
among most stakeholders. Those who sell compliance products to
corporations have every reason to develop sophisticated policing tools
and to develop structural innovations with an eye towards enhanced
policing.
CONCLUSION
Corporate fraud is a two-faced problem. People are, by differing
degrees, inclined to hurt themselves and others. Corporate firms
therefore must address two different and interconnecting dispositions,
opportunism and temporal inconsistency. To address both of these
problems, a corporation should adopt an integrated response that
promotes a combination of policing and structural commitment
devices. Do our legal institutions support this pluralistic approach?
Superficially, the answer is “yes”: free-standing compliance and
risk-management programs offer corporate actors the ability to choose
policing and structure as they see fit. Indeed, the government’s
unwillingness to define “adequate” compliance with specifity may
even be a plus.
Nevertheless, a number of factors push the corporation towards
policing and away from the architectural approach. An excessive
reliance on policing, in turn, may explain compliance’s disappointing
results in terms of reducing overall fraud. Policing can deter and
screen out some of the worst wrongdoers, but it is not likely to cure
those violations that arise from temporal inconsistency.
The takeaway here is not a prescription for new regulations or
laws, but instead a call for further inquiry and analysis. Experimental
researchers can examine the interaction between opportunism and
temporal inconsistency. Interpretive scholars can pay closer attention
to the two dispositions when they conduct after the fact analyses of
corporate scandals. Empirical researchers, who have already studied
the effect of “norms” on corporate compliance, should expand their
focus to temporal inconsistency and its interaction with opportunism
and compliance outcomes.
Meanwhile, corporate enforcers, the general counsels and other
personnel who evaluate entity-level compliance, should give more
thought to the ways in which they construct their compliance
program. Note that this analysis requires more than a simple review of
the program’s size or budget. For structural approaches to work,
corporate enforcers must have requisite freedom to design and test
precommitment and targeted-enforcement devices.
The most vexatious quality of our current legal regime is its
tendency to frame the corporate compliance platform as a replica of
the familiar trial-and-punishment paradigm. This is not the case with
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corporate law generally. As corporate scholars have pointed out,
corporate law precommits both corporate managers and shareholders
in numerous ways.312 The state law framework that scholars praise for
its enabling character is nevertheless embedded with a number of
option-disabling devices. Why has a similar framework not emerged
in the corporate compliance context?
Courts have intoned that fraud “is as old as falsehood and as
versable as human ingenuity.”313 Although corporate policing may not
be as old as fraud, it certainly is as entrenched. In response to a mass
of laws and regulations, corporations routinely surround themselves
with audits, internal surveillance systems, hotlines, and cultural and
educational initiatives. To a large extent, this activity should be
lauded, as it plays a strong role in counteracting opportunistic
behavior. But policing is ultimately a blunt instrument, whose power
is limited. To truly confront corporate fraud’s two faces, the corporate
enforcer must utilize a more nuanced strategy, one that addresses our
tendency to take advantage not only of others, but also of ourselves.

312. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 17, at 7 (“Many provisions of a corporation’s
articles of incorporation and bylaws in fact are best understood as other-regarding
precommitments . . . .”); Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence
on Why Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667
(2003) (discussing primarily why shareholders are “bound” to their board).
313. Weiss v. United States, 122 F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir. 1941).
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